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[00:00:00] The Why Curve, with Phil Dobbie and Roger Hearing. A month of war with Iran. Then two months of a kind of ceasefire. But more than three months of the closure of one of the world's most important shipping lanes. And the surge in global oil prices. And from the White House, there's a deal very near, every week. But not even the markets believe that anymore. From the president whose mantra was no more foreign wars. So as we enter the fourth month of this crisis, what is this doing to America? It's politics, the economy.
[00:00:30] And how will Donald Trump get out of this bind? The Why Curve. Well he does seem to be in a bit of a political deadlock. But if you look at how the United States is doing, I mean, who's paying for this war? The two countries that seem to be doing sort of okay out of it, or seem to be getting by, is the United States because they've got a lot of their own oil. And China because they're probably getting oil from Iran, you know, through some other means. And also they've got this massive stockpile.
[00:00:56] So the two countries that are doing all right out of this, China and the United States, they've just become more dominant as a result. Yeah, they are and they're not. I mean, yes, sure, the stock market's up and all the rest of it. But a lot of people are saying, you know, it's a bubble. There's going to be a real bill to pay for all this. And also Americans filling up their cars. That's the big issue. You know, it's costing them. I was looking at something close to $60 now to fill up the average family car, which is much higher than it normally is. And that hurts people, I think.
[00:01:25] And you begin to see signs of it in America, I think. You know, the Republicans, this latest thing, House of Representatives voted. It won't necessarily get through the Senate, but it's a way of trying to restrict Donald Trump from doing certain things with regard to Iran. But it seems the more you try and restrict him, the harder he comes back. I mean, you know, anything like this just raises his shackles, doesn't he? And he just fights harder. Well, it does.
[00:01:53] But the thing is, he is stuck in a really, really difficult position. I mean, that's why we've had these kind of, oh, a deal's immediately about to happen. A deal this weekend. I mean, it's going to come now or maybe not at all. I mean, all this stuff. Because actually, he doesn't hold the cards right now. And I think that's really significant. And, you know, yeah, you're right. China is perhaps doing all right. But a lot of its neighbors aren't in Asia. They're having a really bad time with the closure of the straits.
[00:02:18] And it's very hard to see really how he can get out of this, what he can do that isn't going to leave Iran in a stronger position. Yeah. Well, these developing nations actually, sadly, are the ones that really are paying the price. Because everyone is paying the price through more oil. There's not as much oil as there used to be. Therefore, the people who can't afford to pay the price just aren't getting it anymore. And that obviously is the developing nations. So they are the ones that are being hit the hardest. But let's look at how this, what this all means for Donald Trump. Is he going to get away with this for much longer?
[00:02:47] Well, that's a really interesting question. Because it does seem to be really causing him major problems. Let's talk to someone who studied it. Dr. James Boyes. He's a senior research fellow at the Center on US Politics at the University College London. He's been on this podcast, of course, before. But his latest book is called US Grand Strategy and the Madman Theory. And he joins us now. So, James, first of all, I just wonder whether you've got one word on your book title that isn't necessary. That word theory on the end.
[00:03:15] Can't it just be US Grand Strategy and the Madman? Well, thank you for plugging the book. I'll take any tense I can, frankly. Anything harder than writing a book is trying to sell a book. Well, you know, the book is not meant to be a rah-rah session for the Trump administration.
[00:03:38] I'm not going to be a fan of the Trump administration merely to try to widen an understanding about what the Madman Theory is and to invite readers to decide whether they believe that Donald Trump is indeed embracing the Madman Theory in his own inimitable style. Well, let me explain what the Madman Theory is, which, I mean, if I'm right, I think we have mentioned on the podcast before.
[00:04:00] It's this idea that if you have someone in charge who some foreign powers believe to be irrational and unpredictable, that can actually help your foreign policy. Well, since you ask, I'll give you my definition of it.
[00:04:13] The Madman Theory is a tactic employed as part of a wider strategy by a sane leader who feigns irrationality in an attempt to convince an adversary that there's a 1% chance that an overwhelming disproportionate threat will be delivered upon them if their will is not adhered to. What's important in that definition is that the leader has to be sane. It's done as part of a wider strategy. It's a tactic.
[00:04:40] And indeed, it is the feigning of madness, not the actual madness, which is where many people's definition of this comes unstuck. Yes, so there we are. So that is the big question, isn't it? Is he applying? So my first question was right. Is he applying the Madman Theory or is he just a madman? Well, I think that... I mean, which all gets down to, is he just a tactic on his part or is he just an irrational human being?
[00:05:05] I think what you've seen this administration try to do time and time again is to utilise an approach which can be likened to the Madman Theory in an attempt to unsettle, unnerve and completely take the wind out of any opponents, anybody it's trying to negotiate with.
[00:05:23] And it does so so successfully that I believe many people have arrived at the conclusion that this president is mad with perhaps not enough evidence to substantiate that claim. Even though the APA, the American Psychiatric Association, has long said that people shouldn't jump to those conclusions unless people are actually in clinical care, which, of course, Donald Trump is not. Is there any example of a world leader that has employed this madman theory to success other than Donald Trump? Well, it's certainly been utilised.
[00:05:53] Most people think about it with regard to Richard Nixon and his association with Henry Kissinger in the late 60s and early 70s when they both attempted to utilise it with regard to the Vietnam War. There are recordings of the two of them very clearly attempting to utilise his approach and with Nixon sending Kissinger around the world trying to convince foreign leaders that Nixon was indeed deranged and would utilise disproportionate force if his will wasn't adhered to.
[00:06:21] I think it's hard to conclude that that was successful in Vietnam. I think if you are to look at what it is that Donald Trump has done during certainly his second term in office, whether one agrees with his policies or not, and I understand why many people do not.
[00:06:36] I think when you look at how he's approached trying to get European allies to increase defence spending as a proportion of GDP with regard to NATO and also the tariff policy, I think you can see the application of the madman theory and how that appears to have been successful from an American point of view so far. But looking at what's going on right now, and I mean that's what we're talking about today, which is the Iran crisis essentially and its effect.
[00:07:02] I mean that's a harder thing to say that there's method in the madness if one can use that idea, because certainly it seems that he is stuck in a very, very difficult bind and that is causing him major political problems at home. The latest thing being a vote in the US Congress that seems to have gone against him with some Republican support as well, suggesting his grip on the party might not be quite what it was. How are you reading all that?
[00:07:29] Well, there's a lot in there actually, which if we've got time, it'd be great to unpack. First of all, one does not need to utilise the madman theory in every instance whilst you are president. It's clear that Donald Trump has, I think, utilised this approach, as I mentioned, with regard to NATO and with regard to the tariff situation. In the Gulf, very clearly, he has taken a very hardline stance.
[00:07:59] What I think you can see with regard to Donald Trump, if one is to try to see a pattern, is that he has, throughout his entire career, said that Iran has posed an existential threat to the United States, which needs to be addressed. Every American president has made similar noises. Very few have actually done anything about it. And when one considers the track record of Iran and issues to do with international terrorism,
[00:08:25] it's hard to suggest that this was a benign entity just sitting there, just minding its own business. Donald Trump, however, has very clearly chosen to wage conflict at this time. And it's certainly nothing I would have suggested that he do. It's a very odd time to be doing this as we head into the primary seasons ahead of the midterms. That notwithstanding, and it's important to recognise that there has been a dent in Donald Trump's own personal standings,
[00:08:54] if you were to look at what you were talking there about his grip on the party, so far, and I have to say it's so far, only one of his candidates that he had put his weight behind in the primary season so far this month, has failed to get the nomination. We are, of course, still waiting for the results in California, which are the big ones. But as at this point, this idea that somehow the war has had a knock upon Donald Trump's hold on the party,
[00:09:24] I think is misleading at best and simply wrong in its entirety, quite frankly. He still has an iron grip on this party. And the vote which you were talking about with regard to the War Powers Act, the reason that has passed the House of Representatives is mainly because a very, very small number of Republicans,
[00:09:48] several of whom have already lost their bid to maintain the nomination going into the November election, have voiced a vote along with the Democratic Party. So that has passed the House. It will move to the Senate, where I imagine it will fail. Even if it were to do so, it would go to Donald Trump's desk and be vetoed. So with this madman theory, it doesn't work if you're dealing with another madman, does it?
[00:10:16] So if you come along and say, right, we've got this whole scorched earth approach, if you don't do what we say, all hell is going to break loose. If the other side says, OK, bring it on because we can give you the same back again, all you do is get an escalating war. Yeah, there's no doubt about it. I mean, the concept is based around, you know, the game theory concepts, things like chicken. It's based upon games of poker. So it ultimately does come down to bluff.
[00:10:44] And the question is, is somebody eventually going to call Donald Trump's bluff? Clearly, I think what we're seeing in Iran at this point is a difficult situation to read. There is very, very limited reporting, I think, which is accurate on either side coming out of that conflict. Very clearly, both sides are positioning this to suggest that they're both doing very, very well.
[00:11:13] There's very little imagery coming out. There's very little accurate reporting, I think, coming out. So it's difficult to ascertain, quite frankly, what is going on. Other than I think it's very clear that the Iranian leadership has been decimated and decapitated. It would appear that their military capacity has been severely weakened at this point. Perhaps the only question that seems to be asked, needs to be asked, is what exactly is America's ultimate ambition at this point?
[00:11:39] And here is where I think Donald Trump is coming unstuck because of his apparent use of the madman theory. And what I mean by that is he has long said that his argument with the likes of Barack Obama and Joe Biden is that American leaders have been far too rational and have given away their negotiating positions time and time again, and that he is not inclined to do that. Well, that's fine. And that actually does make sense.
[00:12:04] The problem is, is that by not giving the American public a lead as to what exactly he wants to achieve and what is going on there, that has created a void. And into that void, understandably, has poured opposition opinion, media analysis, all of which is slanted against the administration. So it's very difficult to gauge an accurate impression, I think, of what is happening in that part of the world.
[00:12:29] And as long as Donald Trump fails to, I think, give a real clear steer as to what exactly the mission is and how it's going with a sense of accuracy and when this is likely to come to an end, that will, I think, continue to confuse and confound not only America's enemies, but America's voting population. And also the fact that he's constantly saying, I've got a deal. The deal's almost done. It'll be done this weekend. It'll be done tomorrow. Or maybe it won't.
[00:12:56] And all this kind of way of which we've been hearing for weeks and weeks and weeks now must make a lot of people feel that he's someone who doesn't meet his promises and isn't delivering the goods, whether you're in America or in the Gulf. And isn't that the problem with the Mad Men theory? You can only do it once or twice. And then after that, people will go, well, you know, we're going to call you a bluff because you never actually deliver on what you're saying. We don't believe you as mad as you're trying to make out.
[00:13:21] Well, I think that it would appear that the Mad Men theory approach worked with regard to negotiations over NATO and getting European leaders to increase defence expenditure. It appears to have worked with regard to the tariff policy in terms of getting nations to increase tariffs. Very clearly now we're in a military scenario in wherein, you know, the Iranian leadership has nothing to lose by going to the wall, quite frankly.
[00:13:50] I mean, it's very clearly seen what's happened to the leadership that was in place at the beginning of this situation. I do think that if one is to be charitable and to say, well, OK, what might the strategy be here?
[00:14:06] I believe that one of the things that Donald Trump is attempting to do with the Mad Men theory is to insert a sense of lack of understanding about what is happening within the Iranian negotiation party. Because, of course, I think most people recognise there are great schisms within the country between the religious leadership and those on the military side of things.
[00:14:33] And when Donald Trump says about being in negotiation but not saying exactly who, with or under what circumstances, one wonders whether what he's attempting to do, and I appreciate this might be seen as a generous analysis, is to sow seeds of doubt within the Iranian leadership. To say, well, is he talking to you? Is he talking to me? And if you sow those seeds of mistrust within the Iranian leadership, that can only be good from an American negotiating point of view.
[00:14:59] We are far too early to ascertain whether that is indeed what's going on. But that might well be one of the ways in which Donald Trump is attempting to utilise this with regard to ongoing negotiations with whoever it is that's left in charge in Iran. That does sound incredibly generous, I would have to say. Yeah, and I said that. No, I would be the first to admit that. What I'm trying to do is to say, look, you know, this is an approach to policy and an approach and a tactic to negotiation.
[00:15:27] And it's far too simple to say, well, Donald Trump's a madman. He doesn't know what he's doing. Therefore, we move to that ultimate conclusion. I'm just trying to suggest that perhaps there is another way of looking at this. And I'd first suggest it could be critiqued for being too generous. It's almost like the art of the deal, isn't it? You know, that whole thing. Well, that's exactly right. Yeah. And, you know, all his iterations about, you know, I'm holding the cards and all that sort of stuff. But there's another character in all of this, of course, which is Netanyahu.
[00:15:56] So is he subscribing to the madman theory as well? It sounds like when he says, you know, we want almost this scorched earth, he actually means it because he's seeing that he wants to end this regime once and for all to remove this threat. And he obviously wants to go a lot further than Donald Trump, not just in Iran, but in, you know, across a large part of the region. And we've seen evidence of that already. So maybe he's not subscribing to madman theory.
[00:16:24] Maybe he is just out for a major change to the dynamics of that part of the world. Yeah, I don't think anybody would think that Netanyahu is employing the madman theory. I think that from, again, what I always try and do is to put you, I think you've always got to put yourself in the mindset and the viewpoint of whoever it is that we're actually trying to analyze. And from Netanyahu's point of view, very clearly, you know, Donald Trump has said that Iran poses an existential threat to the United States.
[00:16:53] Well, I don't think there can be any doubt that that Iran certainly poses an existential threat to Israel. It has, of course, promised repeatedly to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. So this is this is not merely some sort of, you know, theoretical threat that Iran faces poses to Israel.
[00:17:11] And I think that what Netanyahu has done time and again with American presidents is to talk to them about taking devastating action against against Iran on the basis of mutual interest. We've seen representatives from the Obama administration come out over the last couple of months and say, well, yeah, we had the same approach from from the Israelis and we weren't interested.
[00:17:38] Very clearly, Donald Trump has long held the view that there is mutual interest between Israel and the United States when it comes to defeating the leadership in Tehran. I think the great challenge here, again, it comes back to something I was saying earlier on, however, is that from the viewpoint of Israel, it's very clear that what they want is absolute regime change in a Western democracy installed in Tehran. I mean, that would be for the benefit, quite frankly, of everybody.
[00:18:08] But what you're not seeing is that kind of statement and clarity coming from the White House. And I think in part that might have something to do with past American history. If you go back some 20 years, that concept of regime change obviously haunted George W. Bush with regard to Iran's neighbour Iraq. And so I honestly think so. Maybe we should work our way through that list of successful American regime changes. Who's going to go first? Well, let me throw one in. What about Venezuela?
[00:18:37] I'm not quite regime change, but regime control. I mean, it's it's been an interesting one. I wonder if if perhaps, James, you could look at what's happened in Venezuela and say that was the mistaken outline that Donald Trump wanted to try and use with regard to Iran. He thought it might happen the same way. Actually, I do think I do think actually that the if you want to use Venezuela as a blueprint for something that might yet happen. And I think one could look closer to Venezuela and look at Cuba.
[00:19:07] I wouldn't be surprised if there was some action there in the remaining years of Donald Trump's presidency. All the voice, all the sounds look very much as though Donald Trump. And I don't forget who his secretary of state is. Marco Rubio has increasing significance and influence on this administration. Because his background is, of course, Cuban. That's, you know, Marco Rubio. Yes, exactly. And it probably would have happened now if it wasn't the fact if he did it right now. Everyone would say, oh, this is just a diversion from the lack of success in Iran.
[00:19:35] But the problem the problem in Iran is for what Netanyahu wants, this idea of a regime change. There has been a regime change, of course. But then there's been another regime. And if you change that regime, there's going to be another one. Just how far do you have to go till you've actually got rid of all of those extremists that are running the country to get to a point where you could install a Western style democracy? You'd have to get rid of a large proportion of the population, I suspect. And so it's just an untenable aim, I think.
[00:20:03] I think one of the great challenges, if we can use that expression, with the American approach is that I think the White House believed two things would happen if it began American military action. First of all, I honestly think it believed that its European allies would step up and join forces again along the concept of shared mutual interest. That hasn't happened.
[00:20:22] Secondly, I think they also figured that, well, if we start bombing Tehran, if we start taking out the leadership, there will be an uprising from the streets by the Iranian people. That hasn't happened. And I think the latter was particularly unrealistic, especially when you consider the track record of American issues in this past.
[00:20:46] If you look at what happened in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia and in Iraq in the 50s, the 60s and the 90s, when America basically said, look, you know, if you stand up, we'll stand by you. And of course, they didn't. And there was bloodshed as a result of that. So I think there is a naivety, perhaps, to some of the to a great deal of what America is attempting to do in that part of the world. It might have the best of intentions.
[00:21:13] But at the moment, it does appear to be somewhat stymied with no quite clear outline as to what's going to happen next. And certainly the president's the president's daily suggestion this is going to win today. Tomorrow isn't helping. Well, I was going to say we are hearing these relentless, as I was saying earlier, ideas that something is about to happen. But at the moment, the situation we're in is with the Strait of Formas closed and perhaps the principle somewhere in the background that Iran has control of it.
[00:21:43] Israel hasn't got what it wants. It looks like out of a out of a situation like this, maybe they'll be restricted in what they can do in Lebanon as part of a deal. And meanwhile, the price of gas in the US goes up dramatically, relentlessly. I mean, how does this all play out for Donald Trump? Can this be turned around in a way that's going to be successful for him, particularly with an eye on the midterm elections? Well, that's that's the big question.
[00:22:10] It seemed when he launched this operation, a very strange time to be doing it, knowing how long this was likely to take. It was never going to be a quick hit, despite what the White House was saying. And obviously, all eyes in his state at this point are on the midterms. I've just come back from California where the primaries have just been held. Very clearly, the price of gasoline is on everybody's minds. It's particularly expensive in California for reasons that have very little to do with the White House, it must be said.
[00:22:38] But very clearly, this administration came to power on a pledge to address domestic issues. And I think for the first 12 months, it pretty much adhered to that. What I see is that as soon as it got the big, beautiful bill passed, it appeared to not know what to do next. It figured, well, we've got everything done in that package. Now, what are we going to do? Then the Epstein file situation emerged. Now we've got the Iranian situation.
[00:23:05] It appears to be lurching from one issue to the other and seems to have lost that sense of purpose, which I think it came to office with and and did quite nicely to in the first term, in the first year, at least. The challenge you have is if Donald Trump's Republican Party do badly in the midterms and say lose the House of Representatives, then all of a sudden Donald Trump could easily face impeachment proceedings.
[00:23:33] And even though there's no way that he will be removed from office in the on the current mathematical basis of the makeup of the Senate, that will hold up anything that he might wish to do in the second half of his presidency, at which point, of course, all eyes will turn to his imminent successor and the challenge to replace him in the White House in the next election cycle.
[00:23:58] So this idea of the madman approach, though, I mean, is it a madman style or is it just being a bully? Because if you apply the theory and, you know, I grew up in the North England in the 70s and 80s. So there's always a schoolyard bully. So you'd watch that there'd be somebody who would be dominating the playground and everyone was scared of them. But people ultimately teamed up against him.
[00:24:26] And I wonder whether that's what happens. That's why Europe, for example, hasn't, you know, supported America in this war, because America's been the bully. And everyone's going, well, you know, let's side up against him. And so we'll give him what he wants in the short term because we're scared. But ultimately, you know, everyone is united against you. And I wonder whether he's facing the consequences of that. I just wonder whether the approach is a bad one and very short term in its outlook. Yeah, I think there's two points to that.
[00:24:54] I think that Donald Trump likes to do things and get them done very quickly. I think there is a criticism of him that he has a short attention span. And the problem with diplomacy is that it requires skillful development behind the scenes to build up a multilateral approach to achieve something.
[00:25:24] Which might not be achieved by people who've worked in the real estate industry all their life. Not just Donald Trump, but all the people who he's appointed into roles. I agree entirely with you. And I was about to say that perhaps one of the best proponents of that in our lifetimes was George H.W. Bush when he brought together the coalition that led to expelling Iraq from Kuwait some 35 years ago. But that's behind the scenes.
[00:25:49] It's diplomacy and it's getting all the building blocks in place so that when you do pull the trigger for action, everybody's in theatre and everybody knows which way it's going. And clearly Donald Trump has not done that with the European allies. I think there was a sense that, well, if we just start this and start the ball rolling, success will get success. The allies will feel they need to come in behind us. We threaten to withdraw from NATO if things don't go our way effectively. So this will build the ultimate embodiment of that.
[00:26:19] And that simply hasn't happened. And as a result of that, I think it moves to my second point, which is I believe perhaps the way that many people are starting to look at this is, hey, you know what? America operates on a ridiculously short political timescale. Donald Trump, it feels like he only came back to office five minutes ago. We've got the midterms coming up in less than six months. And two years after that, Donald Trump is out of office.
[00:26:47] So I think that there is now potentially rather than, well, he's a bully, we'll just ignore him. It's almost like, can we wait him out and get through this to a point where he will be replaced? Because I think people are looking at the like of Marco Rubio as a potential replacement and thinking, well, you know, whilst he's working for Donald Trump, he is more of an old school Republican with whom I think Europe can better do business.
[00:27:13] Yeah, he seems to be in some ways the smartest guy in the room very often, I think, when people look at the cabinet. But that's the external facing thing. What about internally within the US? I mean, this, you know, having a madman stomping around in effect in the international sphere and being a bully at home too with things like ICE, of course, dealing with immigration. How is that reflected? Because I've seen some figures suggesting his polling numbers are really, really tanking at the moment.
[00:27:39] Yeah, I think one of the difficulties with polls is it depends who you ask and what you ask them. Very clearly, one of the challenges in the United States is that the media has become so polarised that depending upon what your initial, whatever your view is, you'll find someone who'll tell you what it is that you want to believe and you will adhere to that and tune into there more regularly to have your views amplified and reflected back to you.
[00:28:06] I don't think there's any doubt that Donald Trump's polling figures have certainly taken a hit as a result of recent actions with regard to the Iran war and the ongoing impact that has had on the economy. Now, the extent to which that is then carried over and will have a negative impact upon Republicans is possibly doubtful.
[00:28:29] And the reason I say that is that so many of these races going into the midterms, everybody knows who's going to win them. There are very few competitive races across the nation at all. There will be a handful and it will be those handful that really sort of, you know, just tip the scales between success and failure.
[00:28:50] But we are not talking about a huge swathe of races tipping away from Republican to Democrat because, you know, the election is almost baked into a certain extent. We know going into this election who is most likely to get the nomination coming out of the primaries.
[00:29:10] We know, therefore, going into the general election, whether, you know, an incumbent Democrat or Republican is most likely to retain their seat simply because of the balance of power and how districts have been redrawn time and time again to favour the incumbency. So if you were to hazard who is going to prevail in the election, I would suggest to look to who it is that's running for re-election and put your money on them.
[00:29:37] So Donald Trump's not a madman, we're saying. He's applying a madman theory. So he appears unhinged to scare people he's negotiating with. So he has the upper hand. And it's all part of, as you're saying in the book, this U.S. grand strategy. And you've said it's worked in terms of getting Europe to, for example, provide more funding for defence. But has it? It's not worked in this case, has it?
[00:30:02] Because right now it's sort of working in that, OK, people are paying more for fuel, but equity markets are still doing very well. Oil prices actually are well below their peak, even though nothing has changed. In fact, Donald Trump said the other week that it could actually be Labour Day, which is what, in September before the Strait of Formulans is reopened, which is, for most people, would seem a scary scenario. And yet the markets are still behaving as though this is all fine, it's all going to get sorted. But, I mean, it's not getting sorted, is it?
[00:30:29] There's no, you know, there's no, we can't see a route to where, for example, they reach a nuclear agreement, which is the ultimate aim. Or there's a change of regime, which is obviously what Netanyahu wants. So this could stretch out for a very long time. So that theory is not applying. And America is doing OK, along with China at the moment, more than anybody else, because they've not been impacted quite as much. But the longer it goes on, he's got to address this.
[00:30:58] And madman theory is not going to work in trying to resolve this situation, this mess that he's put himself in, is it? Well, you're right. Inasmuch as there is a very strange duality to the state of the American economy at this point, you rightly mentioned the incredible state of the American stock market, which is going from strength to strength on a day-to-day basis. So very clearly Wall Street is doing very, very well.
[00:31:26] But Main Street is not, quite frankly. And one only needs to start travelling around the country to see the amount of stores which have got closed down, restaurants going out of business, people struggling to make ends meet, inflation going up. It's very, very difficult to go shopping without spending at the very least $100 for a very small number of items.
[00:31:52] We moved over here from London to Boston some seven years ago, and we were astonished by the overall cost of living then. It's only gotten worse. This is a very expensive country to live in these days. Donald Trump had been elected with a direct mandate to address those issues. And I think one of the reasons that his polling figures amongst his base have dipped is because of a sense of disappointment
[00:32:19] that rather than focusing upon that sort of MAGA agenda, he has, it appears, fallen into the trap of so many American presidents of wanting to go around the world and find dragons to fight, which appears to be an unnecessary decision of his own making, which could, as you allude to, come back to haunt him in the midterm. Yeah, and he's not doing very well with this particular dragon fight either. And the dragon is biting back. That's part of the problem.
[00:32:45] But, I mean, overall, James, I mean, are you saying that, you know, some of his MAGA base is less well thinking of him, perhaps? I mean, but you basically think that he'll be fine. He will go through to the period when he has to leave office, assuming he doesn't change the Constitution, and maybe a little weaker because Congress won't be as malleable. But pretty much it's going to be business as usual for the next two years. If I could just say, it's not the president's job to change the Constitution that has a very, very specific way of being done.
[00:33:15] And it's not just people make this observation all the time and get it wrong every time, I'm afraid. Donald Trump isn't about to change the Constitution to keep him in power. He cannot do that alone. It's also worth mentioning that, yes, if whatever happens in the midterm elections, people are always getting very excited about it.
[00:33:37] And very often, with rare exceptions, and there are exceptions, there is very often very little change come the day after election day. And as I said, the power of incumbency is such that, again, if you look to who is that's being re-elected, you're probably more likely to see where you're going to get success rather than failure. And then you move into the second half of Trump's presidency, during which all eyes will certainly shift very quickly to Iowa and New Hampshire
[00:34:05] to see how J.D. Vance, the vice president, is faring, whether Marco Rubio puts his hat into the ring, what Governor DeSantos does, because, of course, he will be leaving his governorship shortly in Florida, as he is out of time there. And, of course, then, you know, what else is happening on the Democrat side? You know, we've got, you know, the governor of California at this point. Most people expect him to run. Will AOC put her hat in the ring?
[00:34:32] So, you know, I've said many times the problem with the United States is it's geared up better for campaigning than for governing. And you see this time and again. Everybody's excited about the campaigns. Governing is a slow monotonous business where far too little gets done. And all eyes inevitably now will turn, I think, in six months to replace Donald Trump. And living in America is not as good as it once was.
[00:34:56] So there's a Wall Street Journal podcast that's out this week that cited a 2008 Gallup poll that said one in ten Americans wanted to move out of the United States in 2008. That same poll last year was one in five. And they're calling it the Donald Dash. So lots of people are, you know, not as attracted to living. This is Americans, not as attracted to living in America as they once were. But in amongst all of this, we've still got this question.
[00:35:23] How does the situation that Donald Trump has got himself into as we move towards those midterms, how does this end? I can't see an end to this whole situation in Iran. I can't see a roadmap out of it. Well, again, one of the great challenges is knowing quite what is really happening on the ground. I think one of the challenges is that the way that these stories are spun, quite frankly,
[00:35:51] by both the White House and the leadership in Tehran, and then in the media, is it's virtually impossible to get a real angle on what is actually happening there, other than a state of apparent confusion. I think it's clear, I think, that the Iranian military regime has taken a severe pounding by the United States. But very clearly also, the United States has not done enough yet to convince the Iranian leadership
[00:36:19] that its time is up and it should basically do the right thing and get out of there. So at this point, it seems that there is just a stalemate, I think. This is confusing and confounding, I think, the American people and its leadership, who I think thought that the shock and awe approach, which it seemed to have successfully initiated to start with,
[00:36:46] would lead to a rapid collapse of the Iranian leadership. And that clearly hasn't happened to the frustration of the White House. So now as we are looking at this, they're discovering once again how easy it is to start a war, but how difficult it is to end a war. Is American democracy being damaged by all of this for the fact that there's not been the involvement, you know, the process to involve people in that decision-making process?
[00:37:14] For a lot of the decisions that seem to have been made by these executive orders, you know, the concerns about controlling the media is, you know, and is that part of the reason why people are going, well, we want to leave the United States because it's not the democracy it once was. Is he damaging, you know, what has been the strengths of America? Well, I think, I mean, if you're asking about how it is that Donald Trump is conducting himself as commander-in-chief with regard to Iran, it's clear, I think,
[00:37:43] that every president since the War Powers Act was introduced after Nixon left office has refused to be bound by it, clinging to the powers as commander-in-chief as established in the Constitution. Congress has attempted at all times to try to impose its will unsuccessfully, whether that be led by Democrats or Republicans. So we are in a situation which has repeatedly come up. With regard to this idea of people wanting to leave the United States,
[00:38:13] all I would suggest to you that is that it seems that if you take a poll every time a Republican comes to office, and we've seen this quite repeatedly, that people sort of clamour that, oh, I'm leaving, I'm leaving, they're a threat to democracy. Well, I do have news for you, you know, the news media is still operating. You can still go out in the street and protest against this administration, and rightly do. You can turn Saturday Night Live on every Saturday night
[00:38:38] and see its attempt to bring a sense of humour, if that's what they call it, to the American people, whether that be funny or not. But we're not with Stephen Colbert anymore, and we managed to get rid of him. Yeah, but again, if you've got to be honest, I grant that, but Donald Trump is not basically getting these people fired. If you look at the viewing figures that Stephen Colbert was bringing in week after week, one wondered how on earth it was even covering his salary. Sorry.
[00:39:09] You do get, and you also get people, by the way, you know, who say, oh, I'm leaving the country, and be they celebrities or individuals, and of course, it's a great thing to say, they rarely do, and if they do leave, they suddenly realise, well, actually, I do miss home, and quietly limp back to the United States with a tail between them. Yeah, well, do you know what? I reckon if you asked most Brits whether they like living in the UK or they'd rather live overseas, I'm sure more than one in five would say they'd rather be overseas, and probably would say that they want to move to Australia.
[00:39:38] If only it were that easy. We've got the Australia reference in front of it. If only it were that easy. It's not that easy. And also people find out, funnily enough, that it isn't that easy to go and live overseas. People might say, oh, I want to leave America, but guess what? Just saying I want to go there is one thing. Actually doing it and moving to these countries, you know, you cannot just move to Australia willy-nilly. You know, there are very severe restrictions upon how and who and what age, et cetera, you can do that. Just as the system moved to the United States. We only let the cream of the crop. They let fill in, so that seems extraordinary.
[00:40:08] Just the cream of the crop, Roger. Just the cream of the crop. James, thank you so much for taking us through what actually seems a relatively, well, upbeat assessment, I suppose, of where America is politically at the moment. Except for this big question about how does Iran finish. That's the only thing. If he hadn't tackled that, then all of this madman theory, I could buy into it. But he's overstretched, hasn't he? And he's created a situation where that theory no longer applies. We shall have to wait and see, gentlemen. This is the whole problem.
[00:40:38] We are in a highly fluid situation. And as I've said many, many times, you know, the madman theory does not work in all instances, and it's not attempted in all instances. And what is interesting, I think, is the extent to which Donald Trump has not actually come out and threatened Iran at this point with the overwhelming Disproportion Act, which, of course, he could play, which is the American nuclear arsenal. Ah, yes, yes.
[00:41:07] Well, we haven't got into the nuclear question at all. Well, that would be madman application. A real madness, that would be. James, thank you so much for speaking to us. Really appreciate your time. Thanks, fellas. Well, I know you'll be proud of this one, Roger. Things obviously have been hotting up in the Gulf, but they are hotting up all over the world. It seems so. They're about to anyway. They are, but in a very different sense. They're hotting up because, well, we know that climate change is there, but it's got something really big is coming, which is El Nino.
[00:41:35] And as you often say, El Nino comes around pretty much every year. But this is a weather formation that starts in the Pacific and really messes up global weather, essentially. And there are bigger and worse ones, but this one apparently is going to be absolutely enormous. Well, Australia is bracing itself for it because it's going to be a super El Nino, they're saying, this year. And obviously for Australia, that means much less rain, much hotter temperatures, greater fire risks.
[00:42:05] And what's that going to do to the agricultural sector in Australia when they're already competing, struggling with higher fuel costs and higher fertilizer costs. So it's not just El Nino, it's El Nino plus the Gulf, plus plant climate change. It's the perfect storm. Yeah, I mean, global warming seems to be part of this. The perfect storm, there we are. You see, that's pretty much what it is. But it's a real problem that they can't easily deal
[00:42:34] with something like El Nino when it gets to a certain size because we don't even know what it's going to do, but we are very fearful. A lot of people are very fearful about what it could do for the global economy and for just us hunkering down, I mean, you particularly in Australia, as the wind howls and the rain and the rain falls. Well, not actually, as the case may be for Australia. So yes, well, okay, does this mean that we're reaching a new tipping point for global warming? Maybe we'll wake up this time. Although every time we get hit with worse weather,
[00:43:03] we do tend to ignore it and just say, oh yeah, that's a shame, isn't it? But we're still not going to be serious about climate change. But maybe that'll change over the next six months or so. But look, we'll look at all of that next week on The Why Curve. Join us for that. We'll be back here for that then. See you then. That's what I'm trying to say. You know what I'm trying to say. See you then. The Why Curve