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[00:00:00] The Why Curve, with Phil Dobbie and Roger Hearing. A whirlwind, a roller coaster, a bull in a china shop. Choose your analogy, the first two months of Trump has been wild. And now there seems to be a ceasefire on the table for the Ukraine war, and Washington is back in Kyiv's corner. For the moment. So after the Oval Office row, the temporary switch off of aid and intelligence, where have the pieces fallen?
[00:00:24] Is there a realistic prospect of what Europe and Ukraine could see as a just peace? Or is Donald Trump really Putin's man? And all this just a smokescreen for Russian victory? The Why Curve It's a ceasefire. Well, yes, if it happens. Yeah, if Russia agrees to it. It's not a long lasting peace, is it? No, no, it's 30 days with an idea that it would be extended. I mean the big, big question, as we are, you know, obviously recording this,
[00:00:52] we don't know, Russia, will it accept it? Will it not? I mean, there's a lot of discussion about this. Sounds like it's not, nothing is going to happen until Putin has spoken to Trump. It seems like they're the two people who have to talk to each other for all these negotiations. And the fear is, of course, once that happens, that Putin will say the right things to Trump. He'll go, yes, no, I don't want to give you that. Yeah, good point there. Yeah, no, fair enough. You're a great man. You're a big man. You're a powerful man. Yeah, and it could all go back again. Yeah, it's possible.
[00:01:19] But even if it doesn't, I mean, you know, we don't know fully what's in there, but we know there's not a great deal. I mean, it's like, you know, the US is providing assistance again, they're providing intelligence again, during this ceasefire, when theoretically, if the ceasefire is being held, you're not going to need it. Well, yeah. You know, you can build up, but you know, you're not, if Russia's not attacking, you don't need to see whether they're attacking. That is true. That is true. But I suppose you might know in case they decide to break the ceasefire. I mean, all kinds of options.
[00:01:47] Well, and then does, if that ceasefire is broken, does that, does that, therefore, do you know, do we go back to square one? And the US is right, we're going to, we're going to retract all of that assistance that we've been giving you until you can find a lasting place. Or do the, do the Russians engineer a few, you know, false flag events? Which there'd be no to do. Look, they've broken the ceasefire. Yeah. And Trump goes, yes. Oh, they're wicked. Well, it's bound to happen, isn't it? It's going to. It's going to. It's going to. It's going to happen. It's going to happen. I think what we're saying in all this is it's a very hard thing to see light at the end of this.
[00:02:17] This particular tunnel. But maybe things are slightly better for Ukraine today. Well, yes. But I mean, it's, it is just a stopgap. I mean, it doesn't, it's not any step closer to peace. It's just a respite, isn't it? So there's no talk of territory, for example. Oh, no. No. He's hoping that, that they will, you know, return children. Yeah. I mean, you've got to hope. You've got, I mean, even, I mean, if there's any area, if you've got kids involved, it would be the sensible thing for Russia to say, well, okay, that's an easy win. You can have them back.
[00:02:45] Well, not if they, well, yes, if they thought in those terms, but I don't think they do. I think they just see it as another angle to, to make things more miserable for the Ukrainians and, you know, in the end, force them into conceding. Well, plus the fact, of course, they'll argue that those kids are better off in Russia. And fervently believe it. Yeah. But the other thing is the minerals deal, which, you know, was all on the table, ready to sign and seal. And before the Oval Office debacle, maybe that'll get signed. Maybe it won't. I mean, the argument is if it does get signed and the US has skin in the game, as it were.
[00:03:15] But then, of course, what, one of the problems is that the minerals that they're after are actually in Ukrainian land on which the Russians currently stand. Yes. A chunk of it is. Yeah. How on earth do you work around that? So anyway, a lot of complications. Let's talk to someone who makes a study of all this. David Galbraith, Professor of War and Technology at Bath University, been on our podcast before and he joins us again now. So, David, obviously, we're talking to you the day before we publish this podcast, actually. Let's be honest. And anything can have happened in 24 hours the way things are at the moment.
[00:03:45] But as it stands, this ceasefire agreement, we're waiting for Russia, for Putin, basically, to say yes or no. We think that that probably means that there'll have to be a conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin before that happens. Do you think there's a chance that this is going to go through, that Putin is going to say, yes, I'm happy with all of that? It's only a month. It's quite a dilemma for him, actually, isn't it? Yeah, absolutely.
[00:04:11] It's a dilemma for Putin because he could really use this as an opportunity to press his advantage of what he already has. And like he's been doing recently, I think that the possibility of, you know, so there's a real question really in the United States around whether or not Trump really knows what is in Putin's mind and what he wants and whether or not actually that they're that they that
[00:04:39] the US administration really understands exactly what Russia is willing to take and willing to bargain with. And and I think that this is a really interesting kind of like a snapshot of that, because, you know, if he does agree, if Putin does agree to a to a ceasefire, then obviously that says something about the way that the Trump administration understands Russia, which is which would be somewhat surprising. Yeah.
[00:05:04] And I suppose if if Putin did accept it, then he would be calculating that he gets advantage from it. And it's hard to see how that would be true. And if he rejects it, the interesting question is whether then that pushes. I mean, as Marco Rubio said, you know, we then know who will be the obstacle to peace, in which case you would imagine that the heat would be turned on to Putin, possibly even by Trump. Perhaps.
[00:05:32] I mean, you know, what I think is, you know, probably challenging for for for Ukraine and its allies really is that I don't know how much heat actually the United States can generate on Russia to the point to where actually if Trump decides that he wants to be disappointed with Putin and no longer, you know, suggest that we should withdraw sanctions, then actually
[00:05:59] he's probably still better than the Biden administration as far as Moscow is concerned. So actually, I don't know that we're we're likely to see Putin responding to any sort of pressure from Washington. I think probably more likely the case is that, you know, a ceasefire probably would give both sides an opportunity to regroup and for Russia to continue to bring armaments and artillery
[00:06:27] forward to the point to where actually it would probably do both sides some good. So that they can go all at it. So it's like they can launch their spring offensive after having had a month of planning, basically. So, you know, so it's it's the worst thing could happen if you look at it that way. Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. I mean, it's it's if it doesn't work in terms of a lasting piece, then it's probably not good for either side. But it's not going to, is it? Because there's as far as we know, there's been no discussion about anything to do with territory.
[00:06:56] So the fundamental question about what this is all about is not included in any talk about this ceasefire. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, the territory question is a is a is a big one for for Ukraine, as you would imagine, for for any country who's deciding to give up territory after an invasion. But but what I would say is, is that there's kind of a really an algorithm in terms of, you know, how much territory am I willing to give up? While at the same time, am I likely to get security guarantees also?
[00:07:26] So we imagine that big security guarantees mean that actually more territory could be given up and vice versa. So and and I suspect that that it's really that balance in addition to I think one other point is and that mixes what is the political future of an independent Ukraine and whether or not Russia very much wants Ukraine to be a neutral country.
[00:07:52] Well, he's talked about demilitarizing Ukraine, and that clearly isn't something Ukraine can accept because that would effectively be a surrender. But particularly if the United States is saying, well, it's not it's not our responsibility on an ongoing basis. We'll leave it to Europe. Yeah, absolutely. And and and the question, I think that that for for Ukraine is how do all these things kind of balance out for any kind of sense that they've actually saved something in the
[00:08:18] prospect of being in war now for since 2014? And Russia will be thinking the same thing, really. They've really sacrificed a lot, depending if you believe the numbers somewhere just like lower than a million fatalities and a million fatalities on the Russian side. So they're at the moment. The Royal United Services Institute, Russia and London is estimating slightly over 800000.
[00:08:46] So that is a that is a whopping number. Now, on the Ukrainian side, we've got a number for that on the Ukrainian side. We don't have a number. We don't have a number because allied security forces and intelligence don't talk about Ukrainian numbers. Would you think it was something comparable? I mean, the impression one has is that the Russians use sort of human wave tactics almost so much more likely to be much higher. Yeah, I think it's I mean, there's I think this combination of things.
[00:09:14] One is, is that you're absolutely right. The tactics they use are just more brutal for the combat soldier than than is happening in the Ukrainian case. But as we've seen as things have gone forward, as the war since 22 has gone forward, is that it's really difficult for large columns to make their way past the point of contact. And so what's happening is Russia is more and more trying to send out small armed units, but
[00:09:42] really foot soldiers across the front line. And which means that, yeah, it's it's that's a very dangerous place for any combat soldier. So what about the factor in all this has changed everything? And whether one likes it or not, the fact is that this was a kind of stalemate war. Donald Trump's actions seem so far to have certainly got things in motion in a very big way. Does Donald Trump now, because it's his thing, he wants to be the peacemaker, you know, the
[00:10:11] suggestions are he wants to get the Nobel Peace Prize, whatever it is, just push hard whatever happens to get that, insist upon it. And everyone else, to some extent, has to fall in line. I think that's that's definitely the case. And we can understand that Trump has been talking about this really for a very long time, really even since Obama was given a Nobel Peace Prize, in fact. So there is a feeling that that the Trump administration is really willing to put a lot of pressure on both sides.
[00:10:42] But I come back to the point where, on one hand, Ukraine is very much susceptible to this pressure. Russia isn't. No, because they hold the cards. I mean, if you're looking for a peace deal because you want to win the Nobel Peace Prize, the easiest way of getting to that is to, and you can, you know, maybe you can understand the way he's behaving. You side with a person who's got the best hand. And that's not Ukraine, which is pretty much what he was saying in that meeting in the White House.
[00:11:12] So let's hence, you know, we won't we won't make life too hard for Russia, which is what he's been doing. Yeah, absolutely. And you can I mean, in many cases, you can see the way that he's done corporate deals in the past is that he goes to the people that he thinks that he can actually, you know, that really matter. Yeah. It doesn't matter what's right or wrong. It's just how do we get this deal reached as quick as possible? Exactly. How do we make this happen?
[00:11:38] And and this notion that actually, you know, we'll do anything in order to make, you know, get the result that we want is very much within the American psyche, I would say. But but even to the point to where I think that many, many people are surprised that what Donald Trump has done is he's come into office and very quickly given up a lot of leverage. And and if you if you've looked at Trump in the past, that's just something that he's preached over and over as you never give any leverage in a negotiation. So why is he doing it then, David?
[00:12:08] Because that doesn't make sense. Yeah. I mean, it's really surprised many kind of long Trump watchers as to why he's he's willing been willing to do this. Hence this question about, you know, is there something else going on here? You know, is he? Yes, absolutely. And and, you know, there's a lot of speculation as to what that could be. But the one thing I would say is, is that it probably says something about the Trump
[00:12:31] administrations and not only not only President Trump, but but others in his his cabinet that that actually suggests that they really want this war to be over quickly so they can move on to something else. And and I don't mean necessarily to a new war, but I think that really they don't see Europe or Ukraine as being in the national interest of the United States, nor do they think that they can just walk away without at least trying to get Russia to agree to something.
[00:13:00] But really, they see themselves moving onwards. So what do they leave behind them? Because the logic of what you're saying is that they cut a deal somehow. They do whatever it is that Putin in the end wants. And Putin will have maximalist designs, of course, as we know. So the upshot of this, do you think, would be a neutered Ukraine semi-state clinging on perhaps as Zelensky removed and Donald Trump declares peace, makes a desert and declares peace effectively?
[00:13:29] It's really hard to say at the moment. And just because we see so many things moving at the same time now. So at the same time that the United States is trying to withdraw, we still get mixed signals about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And if the United States remains in NATO or NATO continues to exist in its current state,
[00:13:53] then that means that the nuclear umbrella as it exists will continue to operate, especially under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. So we imagine that actually a future Ukraine, whatever that may be after the war, would have some kind of indication or some kind of protection as part of that, most definitely in a sense represented by those who are close allies like Poland, for instance,
[00:14:20] to the even though even though it's not part of NATO, even though it is not part of NATO. But, you know, something essentially, you know, something could be arranged like a basing, for instance, that could draw European states into Ukraine to the point to where actually it's seen as being a tripline effect for Russia, much in the way that U.S. soldiers are in Seoul and South Korea today, is that they're there not to necessarily defeat
[00:14:48] incoming North Korean troops. They're there essentially to make it so difficult and sufferable for the North Koreans that actually it drags the rest of the United States into it. So there is no deal to be made. And in many cases, you could easily imagine Ukraine being this kind of frontline state and a future standoff in much of the same way. But Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, made very clear that European troops on the
[00:15:17] ground in Ukraine at the end of all this would be unacceptable. Do you think they could move back on? Would they be forced to move back on that? No, I don't think so. I mean, Lavrov says all kinds of things. In fact, so I don't know that, you know, and his, you know, quite often what the Russians try to do is they come out and say these things kind of categorically, you know, that it shall not happen. And then, you know, 18 months later, they've totally renegotiated their stand.
[00:15:46] So I don't think that actually anything Lavrov says, either in a definitive or undefined way, I don't think that really tells us anything about the negotiating style of- Well, there's another country, isn't there, that people don't totally believe these days as well, and that's the United States. So if Donald Trump was to say, don't worry, you'll have our backing in whatever form, I mean, there's absolutely no reason why anyone would believe them on that, is there? And so that's got to be part of the picture for Europe, but also for Ukraine going forward.
[00:16:15] And OK, there's the argument that Donald Trump gives, which is, you know, give us access to your mineral reserves. We'll have Americans in there. So obviously, we'll be there to make sure that the American citizens are- Protective. Protective. And our interests, our financial interests. Our interests are there. But you see, on that, I mean, that's quite easy, isn't it? Yeah, we've got financial interests there. We've got an agreement with Ukraine. Oh, look what's happened. We've got an agreement with Russia now. So, you know, it's like, you know, it's not actually something that's not transferable.
[00:16:44] You know, if there is a takeover at some future date, America sides with Russia at that stage to protect their interests, to keep their business going. Yes. I mean, I think at the moment, the United States wants its cake to eat it too. So it wants NATO. It doesn't want to essentially cause chaos in Europe in terms of withdrawing from NATO. But at the same time, it wants a normalized relationship with Russia, partly because it
[00:17:10] thinks that it can tease Russia away from China, which I think is a real challenge and probably not possible. But I think that's really what the Trump administration is thinking. So the possibility of the United States be willing to use its nuclear forces to essentially defeat a country that it has normalized relations with, I think you're absolutely right. I think it's hard to imagine that the credibility is there for that to happen.
[00:17:39] But doesn't he realize what he's doing in that? So if he's saying, well, OK, we need to try and pull Russia and China apart. And as you're saying, he's probably not going to be very successful in doing that. But in the process of doing that, he's pulling the West apart. So he's actually giving himself less leverage because Europe and the US don't trust each other. I feel like it's not going to last just through this term of office. Now that Europe is arming up because they can't trust, you know, support from the US in the way that they assume they could. Yeah, absolutely.
[00:18:07] I think that the I think the real point that the Trump administration has tried to get across is that actually Europe is insignificant. And and half a billion people insignificant. Yeah. And probably then the largest trading bloc is insignificant. And I mean, you know, there is a feeling that their national interests in the way that they understand them is just not in Europe. And and just a collection of random countries, basically.
[00:18:37] Well, and not even in those cases, as we see, you know, at the same time, they're making security in defense deals with Australia. But at the same time, they hit them with aluminium and steel tariffs. So even in those cases, they can't seem to get their act straight. Really doesn't sound like joined up thinking, does it? And I suppose the big question that was on the edge of this, David, is then, OK, Europe made a big noise, particularly since that awful Oval meeting about we've got to step up. The Germans vastly boosting their defense spending, despite having an economy that's not going
[00:19:07] great places. France doing the same. Britain doing the same. Poland, clearly many others going that way. A big push of taking money from aid in order to put it into weapons. At the end of the day, is you if America is as unreliable as all this? I mean, obviously, it will take time. But can Europe fill the hole, at least in terms of Ukraine? No, is the real answer to it. I mean, they can they can do they can do something that I don't think they can fill the hole as it was.
[00:19:34] I think, you know, as it was pointed out to me and the government, UK government statement, I think last month was the idea that if the United States withdrawals altogether in support for Ukraine, that's not a huge deal. If you just look at the numbers in terms of the total amount being spent, because Europe gives more to Ukraine than does the United States, despite what Trump says. So but the problem is. And doesn't ask for the money back either. No, exactly.
[00:20:03] But and the but the real, I think, trouble for the United for for Europe and for Ukraine, this is that their future doesn't really have all the sharp things that the United States can bring to to bear in Ukraine. And just look at the HIMARS system, for instance.
[00:20:25] It's a ferocious system that is able to really do this kind of patchwork targeting that's really quite, yeah, really quite devastating for for an opponent. And and this is what we see being part of the U.S. toolkit and actually Britain and France and and especially Germany. But nobody else has any kit like that, really.
[00:20:55] Can we buy it from the Americans? Or well, yeah, so long as there's not a kill switch. Yeah. Yeah, it's possible that they could buy that from the Americans. But then would they have to ask, you know, a permission from the Americans when they want to use it, as we see around F-16s? Would they have to get permission from the Americans? But could they? OK, but if we're looking at a longer term than just, you know, the next few months or the next year, I mean, surely there's been a lesson through all of this that that Europe
[00:21:22] does need to be a power equal to the United States, a military power equal to the United States. Is that a grand dream or give it five or 10 years? Could they do that? I mean, there's obviously a lot of expertise already. And a lot of money, actually. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, it's something that's really never been tried before what we're talking about here. On one hand, we're talking about perhaps a European NATO. I mean, that kind of works in the same way that NATO does with the same kind of operating
[00:21:47] procedures and combat procedures that NATO has as it, you know, perfected those during the Cold War, for instance. So we could easily see something like that. But fundamentally, NATO was a vehicle to supply not only conventional forces, but nuclear forces. So if you take the nuclear element off the table, and of course we can, because obviously Britain and France are nuclear forces.
[00:22:14] And Poland, Donald Tusk has mentioned that he would like to be part of that. Well, Zelensky has said, you know, he's left with no choice. Well, they, of course, lost them. Well, no, that was the first deal that the US reneged on, wasn't it? The Budapest agreement, yeah. Yeah, absolutely. The one thing I'd say, you know, going back to the point is that what we're really asking Europe to do is to bring together how many ever, 27 plus, how many ever non-EU like Britain
[00:22:39] and Norway, for instance, and maybe Canada for that matter, where we're bringing them together to some type of military power. Does that mean a common command structure? Does that mean a European army of some sort or whatever the NATO replacement is, NATO army? Does that mean that defense industries are harmonized and brought together under one hat? Many of these things are actually seen quite impossible or feats.
[00:23:08] So I would imagine that when we start talking about Europe being a more military powerful region, I think that we're really talking about Britain being more powerful, France being more powerful, et cetera. I don't think that necessarily we're talking about something the size of the United States or of Russia or of China or any other big state. But are we thinking the wrong way around this? Because one of the interesting things about, you know, what Donald Trump wants to do with
[00:23:35] Russia, Russia is a pretty poor country in a lot of ways. Economically, it's on its knees, it seems. It's very hard to tell, you know, developmentally, not particularly good. Its age profile is extremely bad. It's a country that clearly has major problems. And Sergei Markov was saying, you know, if we take any credence in what he was saying, you're saying on Radio 4 the other day that the Russian society is tired of this war. They just want it over with. Well, they do.
[00:24:03] And is there a sense that perhaps Russia is more of a paper tiger than we imagine? I mean, I think that if we look at Russia as a whole, it would be easy to make that statement. And definitely the last three years of war haven't helped Russia at all as far as that's concerned. But in an authoritarian state, it doesn't really matter because essentially the entire state is an economy is at the hands of Vladimir Putin.
[00:24:32] So actually, Putin can really make a mess and he can make a mess for a long period of time, even as everything else seems to go pear-shaped for the Russians and especially for the average Russian. So I think that if we were in a position where Russia had something like a more representative and responsive government, then we could understand that why that would not be a good idea for them.
[00:24:55] But actually, the power that Putin has over Russia means that we're not likely to see that kind of pressure really make a difference. There's no sign of potential collapse, which is what a lot of people have been predicting for a while. I mean, authoritarian regimes, as you say, are unanswerable, but they do sometimes suddenly keel over. Particularly if a million people have died. So there's a million people, a million families that have been affected. Yeah, I think that many have talked about the future without Putin and what that may mean.
[00:25:24] I think the likelihood at the moment is that anything that comes after Putin will just be, in a sense, just as bad. So we're unlikely to see any kind of liberalisation or anything like that. Or likely that we'll see just Russia kind of close shop and just kind of tend to its own issues. I think that that's probably unlikely to happen. Yeah, so how much of it does get back to, you know, Putin obviously wants to get back to the borders of the Soviet Union.
[00:25:52] I mean, I'm just wondering how, I mean, that is his intent through all of this. I'm just wondering how widespread that is amongst Russian people. Do they share sympathies? I mean, it's a bit like, for example, you know, if we were to lose Scotland and Wales, you know, as part of Great Britain. And we'd invade to recon... I think unlikely. Yeah, we'd get over it after a couple of weeks. Apologies to any... I'm joking, of course.
[00:26:14] But the, I mean, is that the feeling within Russia that, you know, we've got to take back this territory that in effect was, you know, we had to agree to lose it back in the early 90s? I mean, to be fair to the Russian government, I don't think that anybody is talking about, you know, bringing Russia back to the borders of either the empire or the Soviet Union.
[00:26:37] And in fact, in many cases, you know, the kind of language around Central Asia and the Baltic states, for that matter, and much less the, you know, Georgia and Armenia and Azerbaijan have largely been not part of the language that's being used. But Ukraine... So Ukraine is different then? Yeah, Ukraine is different. I mean... And Putin does hate Zelensky. So is part of this personal? It is personal.
[00:27:04] But, of course, remember, Zelensky was elected, you know, in the war. So rather than since at the beginning, but... Or was there from the beginning. But what I would say is that we're in a position to where we have to look at the role that Ukraine plays and the Russian idea of its history, of itself, and things like this. Not to mention all the money that was tied up to eastern Ukraine and Crimea itself, which precipitated this.
[00:27:33] So I think that we're in a position now to where, you know, could... So the fear is, is that actually, if Ukraine were to roll over three years ago, would that actually change that dynamic in Moscow? Would they actually be more interested in retaking more and more? I think they found Ukraine to be so difficult. The likelihood that they would want to continue is really difficult. Not at this stage. And yet that's the assumption that they would, isn't it?
[00:28:02] That's the reason why Europe is trying to build up its defences in preparation for Russia coming back for a second shot. Yeah, absolutely. And you could imagine, you know, if you're Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, where your independence has been taken away from you before, or in the case of Poland, you've been split up and divided twice. It means that you just look at the threat differently than the rest of Europe.
[00:28:30] But you can already see that there's a split between Northern European states, by and large, and Southern European states. Although you could take Italy as being in between. Where Portugal and Spain, particularly, they don't want to have, you know, a harsh relationship with Russia. They're not all that interested in supporting the Ukrainians. They really just want it to go away. Slovakia, definitely under Robert Fico, is very pro-Russian.
[00:29:00] Yeah. As is Hungary, of course. Well, I think actually Hungary is slightly different. I think Hungary is pro-Hungarian, which actually just happens to be overlapping a lot with what Russia is interested in. Yeah. But I think, you know, Slovakia, Robert Fico is just interested in turning that tap back on, really, of natural gas from Russia. It's really interested in the future of Ukraine at all. So going back to the US.
[00:29:24] So, I mean, we touched on this earlier, that perhaps Trump is siding with Putin because it's an easy win, because Putin's there with a position of strength. But obviously, questions are being asked. You know, is he a Putin stooge? Is there a compromat out there? Yeah, because, I mean, he's been swallowing some of the lines, hasn't he? Ukraine started the war, for example. He's, you know, seemingly negotiated. Zelensky's a dictator. Yeah.
[00:29:48] And then negotiated for Ukraine to give ground, but, you know, really not asking for Russia for anything at all, which seems a very curious way to go into a negotiation. So, I mean, you know, it's being asked a lot. David, do you think it's more than it appears? Do you think there is something there? I don't think that there is, actually. I mean, because I just think that the intelligence, you know, apparatus of the United States probably would have found that out a long time ago.
[00:30:17] But I think probably the likely, I mean, the thing is, is that if you look at the United States and you look at the language that is within the core political base that Trump has, you know, the MAGA electorate, if you will. Well, this language around Ukraine has been there almost from the very beginning of the Ukraine conflict and to the point to where actually Putin isn't really, in a sense, kind of miming what's happening in Moscow.
[00:30:45] What he's doing is he's, you know, he's actually using the language of the MAGA electorate in his own, you know, constituency. Which is astonishing to me. I've seen a lot of it on Twitter. I mean, it's absolutely it's it is that it's you know, that Zelensky is the enemy. And and I just I just cannot get my head around how, you know, normal, sensible, supposedly sensible thinking Americans would be will be taking that stance. But they are. And it's extreme. It is extreme.
[00:31:14] And, you know, as someone who's, you know, was born in the Cold War, it's it's it's really kind of unimaginable that we would end up in a position. And, you know, there's this this I remember we had a government Russian, a new Russian minister come to visit us in 1992 when I was studying Russian at school in Memphis, Tennessee. And and we took him to McDonald's and, you know, and he said the same thing to us that I later heard about Mikhail Gorbachev to to Bush.
[00:31:43] And that is, is that actually you're going to miss us because we're not there any longer. You're going to eat yourself. And I think that actually this is this is this is what yeah, this is what's happening. So, David, let's draw this as we move to the conclusion of this at the end of this process, which is where we've come in, the ceasefire, the Jeda talks, things that come out of it. Do you if you had to project forward and I appreciate it's an immensely difficult thing to do, as we said, events can change immediately.
[00:32:09] Do you see a kind of a frozen conflict perhaps coming at the end of this? Not quite war, not quite peace, a kind of ceasefire, perhaps some European troops in Ukraine and a kind of let it all calm down as the likeliest outcome. Yes, I think that is the likeliest, likeliest outcome.
[00:32:29] And I'll say so for one clear reason, and that is, is that these frozen conflicts, you know, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and also in Transnestria and in Moldova. Moldova. Means that actually this is the way that Russia has tried to manage these this kind of post-Soviet politics or regional politics. Anyway, we could easily imagine this to be also the case. Now, do we imagine that anything is going to change in Moldova or Georgia?
[00:32:59] And although we've seen the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh become unfrozen and not a conflict any longer either. But do we imagine that actually that's going to, you know, that if Ukraine and especially the Donbass and Crimea were to enter into that situation? I think actually Ukraine would do itself a favor by trying to, in a sense, withdraw from those claims altogether in the future.
[00:33:27] If Russia wants a frozen conflict, then in a sense, don't be a part of it. Actually draw the line and say, listen, you can have Donbass. You can have you can have Crimea because, you know, 2008, the war that the Russians had against the Georgians, because of what happened in Abkhazia largely meant that that, you know, it's not worth it, really.
[00:33:55] And and I suspect that that what Moscow would want as a what it's really seeking is a frozen conflict. And what we should be seeking is actually a resolution. So if if there are peacekeeping forces from Europe in Ukraine and you can see that then develops into, you know, so you've got British troops on the ground, they might go, well, look, we really need an air base here now. Really, we need to. There's no point in spending all this money on aircraft if we can't stick them somewhere close to where the action potentially is.
[00:34:25] You start to ramp up that that eastern border. You Putin's getting the exact opposite of what he wanted. The advance of NATO de facto. Yeah. Yeah, absolutely. He is getting exactly what he didn't want. And in that case, I mean, it seems to me that there's a point of negotiation here as to how much you can actually the West can decide that it can ensure Ukraine by permitting troops on the ground.
[00:34:54] And how much Russia will be satisfied with taking, you know, these kind of four counties or regions or or. Yeah. Of of of eastern Ukraine. And and actually in Ukraine, that'd be one country away. I mean, they would just pull the border as close as you can possibly putting. Exactly.
[00:35:15] I mean, I think that I think that that, you know, the the the the play that we may see actually is is that Russia finally agrees that European troops can be in Ukraine. But actually what they'll do is they'll set up a Republic of Donbass or something like this. And they'll say that actually Russian and the other Russian troops have to be, in a sense, peacekeepers in that region. And they'll use that eventually when Europe decides that actually it's got something else going on.
[00:35:45] They'll essentially use that as a way to constantly agitate Ukraine. And and of course, this is what the Russians are really good at, as we can see, you know, off the coast of Britain and the and the you know, the in the air over Britain and things like this. Not to mention running into shipping containers. Well, yeah, we don't know about that one yet. Yeah. But yeah, just around Australia, China's been doing the same thing with military maneuvers. So, all right. Well, how long how long is that going to take, though?
[00:36:14] So we've got a month's peace, supposedly, if it happens. Is that going to roll over? Or are we in that scenario where you say, well, both sides are going to arm and they'll be ready to go at it again? Yeah, that's that's that's that's another question. So on one hand, we don't know if the peace will last. I mean, it could not last even 24 hours. So we'll see. Well, that's one final question, actually, because we talked about it just before you came on. And what's what's the risk that Russia uses some sort of false flag operation to say, well, you know, we were doing the right thing. Look what they did.
[00:36:42] Yeah. I mean, that's that's that's exactly what we would imagine. I mean, on one hand, things are observed and watched so clearly from satellites, basically. And so the ability to do anything like that at this stage is probably really difficult. So who are they really hoodwinking around the world? You know, it really strikes me as being. Well, they just need to hoodwink Donald Trump. He seems easily convinced.
[00:37:09] And then whether it's true or not, he's still going to amplify whatever the party line is, it seems, which is why that question keeps on getting asked. But anyway. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, Ukraine now has to show that it's in U.S. national interest to continue to contribute and support Ukraine through the ceasefire or this war in some way. That's what Ukraine is trying to do at the moment. It's trying to draw back and get rid of all the PR disaster that was that White House meeting.
[00:37:35] And so I suspect that probably that is what Britain and other European states who are very strongly transatlantic are trying to do because they do not want to see this transatlantic community. They're all still dependent on it very much. I understand Italy is doing its part. It's going to supply a very nice designer suit to Zelensky for the next White House meeting. We'll see how it goes. David, thank you so much for talking to us. Thank you.
[00:37:59] So while we're talking about geopolitics next week, all this money that we are putting into defence is money that we used to spend overseas looking after people. Indeed. Saving people rather than killing people. Yes, yes. Trying to make lives better. And of course, it's not just us. I mean, we're relatively small in that line. But of course, USAID, which is absolutely massive, has been USAID. It's been decimated. Fertil stopped. And that's not much sign that it's going to continue.
[00:38:26] And I mean, a lot of big UN organisations, humanitarian organisations, absolutely panicking. In this age of selfishness of the West. So there's got to be a price to pay for that, hasn't there? You'd assume. I mean, what is the effect? Yeah. If all the taps like that are turned off, or pretty much turned off, are we going to end up with people who starve? I'm sure people will die as a result. They certainly said that very likely. Of course they will. Yeah. But are we also going to see the collapse of certain countries? Yeah. And therefore creating power vacuums, which comes back to bite us. Yes.
[00:38:55] So even if you were there to say, well, you know, what do we care about those people? Yeah. There is a concern that, you know, the West should be facing. Well, there is that concern. But there is the other argument, which we will air, which is that, you know, hang on. We've been paying people's bills in these countries for a very long time. Is there an argument for saying that that obligation doesn't extend forever? Right. Yeah. But, you know, we are talking about human beings here. We are. We are.
[00:39:22] I mean, another way of putting that argument is have they become too dependent to such a point that they're not standing on their own two feet? But it doesn't seem like anyone would say, oh, well, you know what, we're getting this money and we're just not even going to try. It's like saying, well, OK, people. I mean, that is the world equivalent of saying if we give people dull money, they're not going to work. They're not going to bother to work. Yeah. No, it is. It is, you know, in some ways a terrible argument, but I can see why it exists. We will talk about all this. Yeah. Next week on The Why Curve.
[00:39:49] Yeah, we try not to give you the whole story and our conclusion. Listen to the podcast next week. We'll see you then. Thanks for listening today. The Why Curve.