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[00:00:00] The Why Curve, Phil Dobbie and Roger Hearing
[00:00:04] On the brink of a global conflict
[00:00:06] The world has been catching its breath after what seemed like a route to an all-out war between Iran and Israel
[00:00:12] In the end their missile exchange was minor, little damage, few casualties
[00:00:16] The sparks that could light a conflagration are still there and there's no sign of peace in Gaza
[00:00:22] And the risks are huge, to oil prices, to shipping and to peace across an already volatile region
[00:00:28] So where does this crisis go now?
[00:00:30] And does anyone have the power or influence to end it?
[00:00:34] The Why Curve
[00:00:36] So I wonder whether, and here's a question we can ask our expert today, whether the exchange of fire that we saw between Israel and Iran
[00:00:44] Whether that was designed just as a show of power with, you know, indelibly not causing too much damage because that might have escalated the situation
[00:00:54] I think that's being seen that way, basically they were under huge pressure the Israelis particularly, not to go further
[00:01:00] But at the same time, you know, in a way, yes, you know, little light bombing either side or whatever they call it
[00:01:06] It doesn't solve anything because the confrontation is still there
[00:01:10] I mean, Gaza is still horrendous, they know that, they can see it
[00:01:14] And there's very little really, I think, of a way in which that can be easily or quickly solved
[00:01:21] And while that is there, learning away, all these other conflicts are continuing
[00:01:25] Well, yeah, I mean, what is the end game? It's the question, isn't it? And has Netanyahu actually got a plan?
[00:01:29] Did he ever have a plan? And that's his problem, isn't it? That he's not getting hostages back
[00:01:35] He's wreaking havoc but he's not actually achieving what he set out to do
[00:01:41] No, and I mean, many people say, perhaps cynically, that his main plan is to stay in office and therefore out of prison
[00:01:47] But she's watching a lot of people, not just for this but for a whole range of other things
[00:01:51] He was on a criminal trial anyway to deal with some corruption issues
[00:01:56] But also he has simply seen as someone who bore the responsibility for what happened on October 7th, the horrors of that
[00:02:02] His head of military intelligence has just announced that he's resigning over it
[00:02:06] I mean, the pressure is going to build, but the big, big problem is, in a way, it's a small issue
[00:02:11] It's globally, you'd think it's about a small area, but it's absolutely causing mayhem in the US, here in Britain
[00:02:18] But also increasing tensions in that whole region which has rather more than it can handle anyway
[00:02:24] Yeah, he was dividing the world, isn't he? And it does show, I mean, this is a part of the world that's divided the world for, you know, for, well
[00:02:31] Since the 1940s really, hasn't it? And it shows no, and all this is as a reminder that that division just hasn't gone away
[00:02:39] Iran could bring a much wider global conflict, that's the problem because Iran is linked to Russia
[00:02:44] Russia, of course, fighting in Ukraine, all these things are linked and that is the fundamental problem
[00:02:48] But let's pick all this up with someone who really knows about it, Hassan Al-Hassan is senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
[00:02:56] And he joins us now from Bahrain
[00:02:58] So Hassan, it seems like Iran's attempts to try and break through Israel's defences
[00:03:03] I mean, they were destined to fail and maybe they knew that and Israel's response caused no collateral damage. There's no reports of casualties
[00:03:11] So on both sides, was this just a, were they playing it cool? Was this a showcase of strength but not execution?
[00:03:19] Was this sort of like a deliberate move to say, well, this is to show that we can do this but we don't want to escalate things
[00:03:25] To a very large extent, yes. I mean, let's remember how this started, right? Israel attacked Iran's consulates in Damascus
[00:03:33] That was perceived by the Iranians as an attempt by Israel essentially to change the rules of the game
[00:03:41] So this so-called shadow war between Iran and Israel had been going on for some time
[00:03:46] But even shadow wars have implicit rules of engagement, right? There are things you do and things you don't
[00:03:52] And I think that was seen by Iran as Israel really trying to change the rules of the game, trying to change the rules of engagement
[00:04:01] And so that necessitated from the Iranian perspective a response that would show that Iran is able to fend for itself
[00:04:11] That Iran can restore its image and its credibility but without provoking an all-out conflict
[00:04:18] So what you're saying is this was a measured response if you like on each side after something that had crossed a line
[00:04:25] So a way of saying to each side or each side saying to each other, look, let's take things down
[00:04:30] Let's not make this a bigger conflict
[00:04:32] I think so and I think but the two sides do it very differently because their capabilities are different
[00:04:37] So for Iran to be able to land a few say missiles inside of Israel
[00:04:43] And for Iran to be able to penetrate Israeli defenses, which it wants to send that signal
[00:04:48] It wants to say I can get to you, I can penetrate those defenses, I can actually inflict damage if I want to
[00:04:55] What it needs to do is very different to what Israel needs to do
[00:04:58] So Israel has the capability to bypass Iranian defenses much more easily than the other way around
[00:05:05] So for Iran to be able to do it, it has to launch a multifaceted attack that combines cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and drones
[00:05:15] And so on and launch a significant number to try and overwhelm and essentially bypass Israeli defenses
[00:05:22] But for Israel to be able to land that same message
[00:05:27] It has the sophisticated technological capabilities using its advanced aircrafts and even its own capabilities within Iran
[00:05:38] Whereby it can land that message but I'll be at using different tools
[00:05:42] But I think ultimately it's about both sides saying we can do damage if we want to
[00:05:47] We need to do this as well to restore our image and our credibility
[00:05:52] But we don't want an allowed conflict
[00:05:54] So I think that's the consistent message we're hearing on
[00:05:56] Are you sure that they don't want an all-out conflict there?
[00:06:00] Because I'm sure Israel wouldn't care too much as you say it's technological capabilities are quite up to dealing with that
[00:06:06] That's a great point and I think Israel wants some escalation
[00:06:11] But to my mind yet we don't see Israel wanting the situation to completely spiral out of control
[00:06:18] So the question is why did Israel launch that attack in the first place?
[00:06:22] Now surely it wanted to impose some costs on Iran for supporting Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas
[00:06:29] Other militia groups that often take aim at Israel
[00:06:33] Surely they might have perceived a tactical advantage in taking out some of Iran's senior commanders
[00:06:38] Who play a role in coordinating various activities in that part of the world and so on
[00:06:44] But one wonders whether there was a political motive as well that had to do with the fact that
[00:06:49] At the time international pressure was piling on Israel including from the United States
[00:06:54] Because of its highly atrocious contact in Gaza because of the dire humanitarian situation there
[00:06:59] So potentially perhaps Israel wanted to deflect attention away from international attention away from the situation in Gaza
[00:07:08] And also perhaps generate some national unity because I think at the moment Bibi Netanyahu is doing fairly well
[00:07:15] And the post-bite comparison to his performance over the past few months
[00:07:19] And so there might be obviously a political dimension for why Israel may have wanted to escalate
[00:07:25] And why it may want to escalate once again down the line
[00:07:28] So I agree that there might be some political and tactical motive for Israel to seek escalation once again
[00:07:34] But I don't think that, and again this is my personal view
[00:07:39] It did not seem to me like they wanted to provoke an all out conflict
[00:07:43] I wonder how long that popularity for Netanyahu is going to remain though
[00:07:47] Because for all of the efforts, I mean hostages, the majority of the hostages haven't been found
[00:07:52] I think 130 remain or thereabouts
[00:07:55] Israel reckons that a quarter of those are probably already dead
[00:07:58] I mean for all of this time and all of this bombing why haven't they found them?
[00:08:02] Because bombing is not necessarily the best way to find hostages
[00:08:06] If there are better ways presumably of doing so
[00:08:10] I think the easiest way I think would have been to make earnest efforts to secure a deal
[00:08:20] And I think a deal where Hamas would essentially release all of the hostages in exchange for a permanency's fire
[00:08:30] Was on the table but it was something that I think Israel was not willing to accept
[00:08:35] In addition to some of the other conditions that Hamas had including large scale releases of Palestinian prisoners and detainees
[00:08:42] Some of whom have been held without charge for long periods of time
[00:08:46] But I think that kind of deal was on the table but politically for whatever reason
[00:08:52] Israel's extreme right-wing government didn't want to take that deal
[00:08:57] Partly because I think securing the hostages is not necessarily at the top of its list of priorities at the moment
[00:09:06] They said they wanted to see off Hamas but realistically would that ever be achieved
[00:09:11] Because obviously as you've said there's the backing isn't there from elsewhere
[00:09:16] And we'll just see even if you lost all of the leadership of Hamas
[00:09:21] I'm sure we'll be back in another form fairly soon after wouldn't it?
[00:09:24] Hassan on that point is it true to say perhaps that neither the Israeli government nor Hamas actually really wants this conflict to end
[00:09:33] It kind of doesn't hurt either of them at the moment
[00:09:35] So the somber reality I think is that for Israel to totally annihilate Hamas
[00:09:42] It would have to in one way or another totally annihilate Gaza
[00:09:47] Either by making Gaza an unvivable place which has already been achieved by a large
[00:09:54] And essentially by engineering a large-scale exodus of Palestinians from Gaza
[00:10:02] Especially towards the Sinai or elsewhere
[00:10:04] So I think unfortunately the Israelis seem to be willing to pay that price
[00:10:11] And actually some of the more extremist elements see this as an historic opportunity to finally essentially incorporate Gaza into the larger
[00:10:22] And essentially to get rid of the Gaza problem as it were from their perspective
[00:10:28] The issue is that for Hamas
[00:10:32] Yes they are potentially on the brink of if not total annihilation at least being hurt very badly
[00:10:41] I mean already some of their leaders have been taken out
[00:10:44] They've lost a number of soldiers even though they seem nevertheless to be significantly operational
[00:10:51] The issue is that I think for Hamas so long as Israel cannot claim victory
[00:10:57] In a sense that's already an indirect victory for Hamas
[00:11:02] Because A it can claim to have prevented Israel from achieving its goals, it's still alive
[00:11:08] In a sense it has provoked Israel into embarking on a war that has led to Israel being almost totally isolated on the international level
[00:11:20] And whereas the Palestinian issue had been dying a slow death for a number of years
[00:11:25] It's now come back firmly on top of the international agenda
[00:11:29] The Palestinian issue has been revived in the consciousness not only of ordinary Arabs
[00:11:35] But also generated a lot of solidarity throughout the world
[00:11:40] So you now have an historical reflection point where instead of the slow death that the Palestinian cause was dying
[00:11:48] There now might be a change
[00:11:52] In a sense it's Hamas yes in a sense has an interest in seeing the war even though it's obviously very high risk
[00:12:04] But I think ultimately the choice for Hamas was do we let this issue die a slow death and then
[00:12:11] Or do we take a very daring move and try to reignite it and meaning that leads to a big historical change
[00:12:17] But I mean it seems unlikely doesn't it that Hamas' intention right at the beginning was to try and make Israel look bad
[00:12:25] By attacking and killing hundreds of Jews there would be an overreaction by Israel
[00:12:32] And that would be seen by the world as a bad thing
[00:12:35] Do you think they were really that calculating in that move?
[00:12:38] Well I don't think they expect because what's the alternative I mean the alternative is that they would have expected to physically overcome as well
[00:12:46] You know in a single attack I really don't think so
[00:12:49] I don't think that they believed that they could inflict defeat on you know physical defeat on Israel and totally over
[00:12:56] So what were they hoping to achieve? Well why did they do that? And also why take all the hostages?
[00:13:01] Because if you took hostages and you're trying to make a point
[00:13:04] If you were going to use it as a bargaining power for example then you'd be sending videos or photos of the hostages to say
[00:13:11] Well here they are they're still alive here's our bargaining chip this is what we want but it seems like none of that's been going on
[00:13:17] So I think you know what Hamas was trying to achieve was essentially political effect
[00:13:22] First of all destroying Israel's image of invincibility
[00:13:26] Because there's been a narrative of Israeli invincibility which in a sense has prevailed
[00:13:33] And they most certainly wanted to harm that narrative
[00:13:37] Ultimately I think they also wanted to position themselves as a strong resistance force that's militarily effective and so on
[00:13:46] So that for them projecting that image is also very important but I think ultimately I do think they wanted to provoke Israel into an overreaction
[00:13:54] And I think they were hoping to achieve a political effect by doing so and were hoping to use the hostages as a way of securing a ceasefire
[00:14:02] Because they knew that Israel would embark on a very forceful course of action militarily
[00:14:09] And they believed that the hostages would be their way out that they could secure a permanent ceasefire
[00:14:15] Or release of many Palestinian prisoners and detainees which for them is a big issue
[00:14:20] And potentially even secure concessions on Israel in terms of the Al-Aqsa Mosque which has been violated in the most egregious and disgusting of ways
[00:14:31] Increasingly especially in the months leading up to the October 7 attack and we're hoping to achieve an effect there
[00:14:37] Is there also an element of this that could be said to be what Iran wanted Hamas to do?
[00:14:41] Because it may be its way of saying what the effect was and then say oh well that's what they always intended
[00:14:47] But because Iran backs Hamas this has been advantageous to Iran in the sense that the Gulf area where you are
[00:14:54] It's been more difficult for Gulf countries to begin to carry on with what they were trying to do which was almost to have a kind of relationship with Israel
[00:15:03] Building almost to a diplomatic relationship and that obviously has been pushed onto the back burner
[00:15:08] Because they can't for their own publics with what's going on in Gaza
[00:15:11] So in that sense Iran has gained because it's managed to disrupt that relationship
[00:15:16] So I agree that in multiple respects the situation turned out to be favourable to the Iranians
[00:15:21] But I would be very wary of saying that the Iranians had masterminded and engineered the October 7 attack
[00:15:29] Partly because that's not the kind of relationship they have with Hamas it's not a command and control relationship
[00:15:35] Hamas despite receiving a lot of support and training and arms from Iran is not in a command and control relationship with Iran
[00:15:47] They still enjoy a significant amount of independence and autonomy
[00:15:53] And I think that even from an operational security perspective had too many people known about this operation in advance
[00:16:01] There would have been a much higher likelihood of Western or Israeli intelligence picking up on this and then foiling it
[00:16:09] And that's why I think actually it's highly likely that even some of Hamas' senior leaders outside of Gaza
[00:16:15] Including in Turkey or Qatar or elsewhere might not even have known about this attack in advance
[00:16:22] So it's to my mind the likely scenario is that this was orchestrated and engineered and masterminded by a close circle of Hamas' leaders
[00:16:33] Who are at the military and political wing but very firmly within Gaza and actually not much beyond that
[00:16:41] Well if the intention was to make Israel look bad that Israel would overreact which obviously they have
[00:16:48] Seems like and I agree with Donald Trump on this it's a terrible thing to admit to
[00:16:53] That's dynamite that is
[00:16:56] He was talking to one of his TV friends saying that Israel is because he of course has been a big support of Israel
[00:17:03] But he says they're now losing the PR wall because they keep on posting pictures on social media of the destruction that they've caused
[00:17:11] So they're proud of it so they are the worst PR disaster ever just by you know just by showing the scale of the havoc that they've caused
[00:17:19] Yes and I think that you know that's putting it mildly
[00:17:22] I think you know Israel has obviously achieved a military success and so far as they are clearly the stronger party
[00:17:31] They've destroyed most of Gaza, they've killed a number of Hamas fighters
[00:17:36] In addition of course to tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians women and children included
[00:17:42] But they've clearly lost the war in strategic terms in the sense that Israel has never been as isolated as it is today
[00:17:51] There is a sea change clearly in and a generational shift in attitudes towards Israel including in the West
[00:17:58] And in the United States including among young Jewish Americans and so on and so forth
[00:18:05] So I think Israel's overreaction to put it mildly has created a very significant change internationally globally
[00:18:17] In the way Israel is perceived in its image and I think that's going to have long lasting repercussions
[00:18:24] That Western leaders despite being somewhat slow to catch up especially in the United States and the UK
[00:18:30] To this to these shifting attitudes in public opinion will nevertheless
[00:18:34] You know these are pressures there are pressures there that they won't be able to ignore
[00:18:38] Where does where and how does this end because that's what a lot of people are asking now
[00:18:42] It's been going on since October the 7th and there doesn't seem to be any prospect of a ceasefire
[00:18:48] It seems like even perhaps Qatar is getting across with Hamas and might not help and assist with negotiations
[00:18:55] The Israeli hardliners clearly don't want anything on the kind of grounds that Hamas can provide
[00:19:01] Does it just go on forever until the destruction of Gaza? How do you see this ending?
[00:19:06] It's good I mean it's extremely difficult to predict in advance because it's going to depend on how Israel behaves
[00:19:13] Whether Hamas makes concessions or whether Israel makes concessions or whether we end up seeing greater international
[00:19:19] And especially US pressure on Israel to change its behavior
[00:19:22] So there are a number of dynamic factors that are difficult to predict
[00:19:26] But I think it's we can't rule out the worst case scenario which is this war dragging on
[00:19:32] And dragging on for a long time leading to a very high number of civilian deaths in Palestine without a ceasefire in sight
[00:19:40] And with bouts of and rounds of regional escalation here and there
[00:19:45] So a full scale escalation with Hezbollah in Lebanon for example is not completely out of the question
[00:19:51] Even though it seems as though Hezbollah doesn't want it
[00:19:54] But I wouldn't be surprised if Israel saw an opportunity to get rid of Hezbollah once and for all
[00:20:01] So there could be again the prospect of regional escalation is very much on the horizon
[00:20:08] A ceasefire seems very difficult to achieve at the time being because there simply isn't enough international pressure on Israel at the moment
[00:20:17] Domestically Israeli public opinion is still I think mostly in favor of the war
[00:20:23] And so there simply doesn't the ingredients the factors simply don't seem to be in place for there to be a quick and peaceful resolution to this conflict
[00:20:32] This could drag on for a long time just the way the Syrian civil war for example dragged on for a long time
[00:20:37] Yeah, exactly. So do you think war crimes are being committed and how and when will we know because obviously the UN relief agents the UNRWA
[00:20:47] Israel is saying well they're heavily infiltrated by Hamas so they can't be trusted
[00:20:52] Accusations they're involved in the October 7 attack in the first place so anything they say can't be trusted
[00:20:58] I mean our war crimes taking place and how will we find out is it going to be after the whole thing is over
[00:21:04] Which could be as you know implying could be years away. So I think those allegations that you've cited were made by Israel very specifically towards the UN refugee agency
[00:21:12] Which is a very interesting agency it's a UN agency that is specifically mandated with taking care and addressing Palestinian refugees
[00:21:23] I think those allegations have barely been shown to be without real foundation and that's why I think a lot of the countries including European countries that initially took the decision to freeze their own voluntary contributions to UNRWA have since reversed those decisions
[00:21:42] Not only because of the vital role that UNRWA plays in keeping Palestinians alive in Gaza and also elsewhere in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank
[00:21:54] But also because I think of the unsubsubstantialized, seemingly unsubstantiated nature of these allegations
[00:22:00] More broadly I'm not obviously an authority on international law. I can't make an authoritative determination as to whether Israel is committing war crimes
[00:22:10] But here's the point. There is a binding UN Security Council resolution on Israel to work towards a ceasefire that it is clearly flouting
[00:22:20] There is an ICJ ruling that holds Israel to be very plausibly committing genocide and violating the genocide convention that Israel has shown a lot of indifference towards
[00:22:32] And there are indications that the International Criminal Court could very soon take measures vis-a-vis Israel
[00:22:40] So I think when you listen to the UN Secretary General speak the way he does about Israel's behavior and many international legal experts saying that we can very much forget about international law having any credibility after the way Israel has been behaving in Gaza
[00:22:59] I think those are a very serious set of indications about the level of respect Israel has shown for international law. I get to put it very politely
[00:23:10] And yet the West is still feeding weaponry to them, you know, even though maybe these accusations being made
[00:23:19] We saw the example this week, didn't we? The hospital in Karnunas 300 bodies found in southern Gaza after the Israeli troops withdrew and there's a catalogue of similar situations, isn't there?
[00:23:31] And we don't know what the reasoning has actually happened there because journalists aren't allowed in for a start
[00:23:37] Let's get back to the question, how do we find out what's going on? I mean is it possible to get any truth during wartime at all? But in the meantime, we continue to feed money to Israel and that's helping the war to continue even though we have concerns about the way it's being fought
[00:23:55] Hassan, do you think that could come to an end? I mean you talked about a change of perception of Israel. I mean clearly the US is still willing they passed a major funding package just in the last few days
[00:24:07] But more generally do you see problems perhaps in that relationship between the West and Israel perhaps to the point of not funding, not giving weapons, calling all that off
[00:24:17] So I think when it comes to Israel's closest partners in the West, say the United States, Germany for example, it seems that there is a very small really meager chance that we're likely to see the end of or a suspension in American or say German assistance to Israel anytime soon
[00:24:39] There are a number not only of political questions, you know, is supporting Israel at this present juncture, the more likely writing to do, is it the writing to do vis-a-vis say President Biden's own voter base and so on
[00:24:56] There are even legal questions around whether the United States, pardon, is legally able to provide Israel and the Israeli military with military assistance given the real questions about human rights violations and war crimes and so on and so forth
[00:25:17] But I think the bottom line is that there's a very unshakable, you know, supporting Israel as I think part of the unshakable core of US foreign policy
[00:25:27] And I think the US has very clearly shown that it's really willing to put a lot of things on the line in order to maintain that relationship
[00:25:37] So unfortunately, I think, you know, as far as Israel's core security military partners in the West go, I don't see a real change to that policy
[00:25:47] What I do see is a number of European countries taking a stronger diplomatic position and trying to apply a bit more diplomatic pressure on Israel
[00:25:58] But clearly, I mean, it's been very ironic looking at, you know, indications that maybe now some of the European countries might be willing to recognize Palestine as a state
[00:26:10] Just when it's become, you know, almost impossible to implement a real Palestinian state in reality
[00:26:18] Yeah, there's a real irony in that, isn't there? The moment of when Palestinians really have least control over themselves is the moment you recognize them
[00:26:28] But Hassan on this element of what's going on there, I suppose there are people and it's often said, you know, I'm very interested in what's going on in the Middle East
[00:26:35] People say, well, does it actually matter? This is a fight between one relatively small nation and a group which they're attacking
[00:26:43] And perhaps a couple of other countries around that, but it doesn't actually make a huge difference on the international scene
[00:26:49] We give it perhaps too much airtime in some ways. Do you think it actually could become a bigger, more dangerous conflict than it is now?
[00:26:57] I think it's already an important conflict in ways that some people, I think, do not yet fully appreciate
[00:27:06] Now, of course, in the grand scheme of things, as you said, this is a conflict between a fairly small nation and an armed group
[00:27:14] Why should it matter? It doesn't have a major impact on international trade. The risk of nuclear exchange is extremely limited
[00:27:23] And so on the grand scheme of things, does it change the global balance of power and so on? The answer to all of that is no
[00:27:29] But I think it does have a significant effect for multiple reasons. One, because I think it accelerates really the fraying of the so-called international rules-based order
[00:27:40] Now mind you, the so-called international rules-based order, these rules were not really always held in high regard in the Middle East
[00:27:50] They were routinely violated. You've had multiple illegal invasions, legally questionable military interventions including Iraq and others and so on
[00:28:00] So the Middle East has not been traditionally a region in which the international rules-based order was truly upheld indeed and not only in work
[00:28:10] But I think the clear double standard vis-à-vis Israel's illegal occupation of Palestine and Russia's illegal occupation of Ukraine
[00:28:21] As I think and will likely accelerate the demise of the international rules-based order because essentially the proponents of this order, notably the United States
[00:28:33] I think have demonstrably been shown to act more according to their geo-strategic, parochial, geo-strategic interests rather than on principle
[00:28:41] So I think we're likely to see a wide disenchantment with that notion and acceleration of its demise, not to mention of course the risk of real regional escalation involving Iran and Israel
[00:28:53] And if that happens then of course the region is still quite important for global energy
[00:29:00] So even the direct potential spillover effects of that conflict are important but I think the real importance of this current conflict is in its symbolic dimension
[00:29:10] And what it means for the credibility of the United States as a promoter of an international rules-based order. I think this is truly the reason why it matters
[00:29:19] And when it comes to trying to find some sort of resolution, some sort of halfway house that has to be compromised at some point otherwise wars do go on forever
[00:29:28] How much of it is people being caught up by who is representing them? So how much do the Palestinian people, how much of their views are reflected by Hamas and how much of the Israeli people
[00:29:42] Are their views reflected by Netanyahu or are they completely, in both cases, are they completely odds with their populations?
[00:29:50] That's a great question. I haven't seen recently any polls coming out of Palestine, but that could be my own feeling
[00:30:00] But I haven't seen any recent polls being for example conducted in Gaza and I think under the present conditions
[00:30:09] I want to imagine how you'd go around with a clipboard in that part of the world
[00:30:13] Yes, I think so at the moment yes. But mind you there were polls coming out of Palestine right before October 7
[00:30:21] And what they showed was that for example the Palestinian Authority which is considered internationally to be the sole legitimate international representative of the Palestinian people
[00:30:33] Is widely seen including the West Bank as ineffective, as corrupt, as unrepresentative and unpopular
[00:30:41] And interestingly one of the questions clearly came out President Mahmoud Abbas would essentially lose against any other Palestinian candidate from any other faction
[00:30:52] Including in the West Bank which is supposed to be his stronghold right
[00:30:55] So I think there's clearly a deficit of representation on the Palestinian side
[00:30:59] On the Israeli side, you know ironically just before October 7 Israel was largely a split nation
[00:31:07] And it was going through its own internal existential crisis about the identity of this state
[00:31:14] And whether to summarize it in a very crude manner whether this was going to be a democratic state or essentially a Jewish national system
[00:31:21] This was to do with the powers of the Supreme Court and the constitutional lack of it
[00:31:25] Of course which were you know issues about the wider question and the wider struggle of Israel's broader identity
[00:31:33] And what this nation was about but I think the point is that clearly there is a deficit of representation on both sides
[00:31:39] And I think at the moment on both sides the extremists are essentially in control and calling the shots
[00:31:46] And that obviously doesn't bode very well for the prospects of resolution
[00:31:50] But it seems like around the world that you know people are divided there's not too many people with a moderate view
[00:31:57] As to how this whole situation is handled you look at you know protests that are taking place in London and in Europe
[00:32:02] And in New York in fact all over America people are either vehemently pro-Israel or vehemently pro-Palestine
[00:32:10] I guess people don't march to say well we're here we're marching for the moderate could be this way or that
[00:32:16] You hold a position when you march but it's I mean the strength of views being held is very strong isn't it
[00:32:22] Some might even say extreme in some cases
[00:32:24] That's true and I think it's partly because people project a lot of broader issues onto the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
[00:32:31] It's not simply about Israel and about Palestine or about the exchange of fire
[00:32:36] I think it's become an issue that symbolizes a number of broader disagreements and struggles about power and about what the international order should look like
[00:32:52] So I think a lot of people see in Israel in a sense a sign of the way and project onto that issue broader disagreements about the US foreign policy for example
[00:33:08] Whereas you know others will project on to Palestine and we'll see Palestine more as symbolizing the struggles of you know peoples that are more broadly aligned with the global south
[00:33:21] So I think you know these are and the reason why they're so polarizing is partly because of the wider symbolic dimension that they take
[00:33:30] But I think you know it's let's also remember that you know I'm not trying to suggest a moral equivalency here because in a sense ultimately there is an illegal long-standing Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories
[00:33:47] I mean this is a very unique situation of a country that is still a settler colonial country that imposes a segregationist arrangement on people under its control and under jurisdiction
[00:34:01] And which had placed Gaza under a very long-standing blockade essentially
[00:34:07] So again I'm not trying to suggest a moral equivalency I think that's in my mind at least it's very clear
[00:34:13] But the question is what you do about that and that's the problem isn't it because there's no easy answer to that
[00:34:20] And that's one that's come up again and again and again so as we come towards the end of this discussion I mean we have gone through a lot of Middle Eastern crises over many many years
[00:34:31] It seems to come up perennially although as you say the Palestinian cause was going down the international agenda perhaps until October the 7th
[00:34:38] But is this crisis actually different? Is it simply something that's going to perhaps die away in some form and then we'll come back to it another three years
[00:34:46] Or has something fundamental changed with this conflict that's been going on now?
[00:34:51] I think there's something fundamentally qualitatively different about this conflict
[00:34:55] Primarily because of its particularly painful nature and the extent to which Israel's military campaign has been devastating
[00:35:05] The amount of suffering that it has inflicted is unprecedented by multiple counts
[00:35:11] But also because of the fact and the way this war has been essentially advertised and broadcast
[00:35:18] Essentially uncensored footage that is coming out through social media has I think allowed this conflict to become really qualitatively different
[00:35:29] And to I think weigh on people's imaginations and consciousness in ways that other conflicts may not have
[00:35:36] And I think it's interesting because it comes at a broader reflection point when the West is engaged in a confrontation with Russia over Ukraine when China is ascending
[00:35:48] So in a sense that ties into some of these broader dynamics
[00:35:52] Now unfortunately as you know long term observer of the Middle East things can always get worse and we can always see something worse down the line
[00:36:01] And we can unfortunately never rule that out but I think this one takes on a qualitative and special significance of its own for the reasons that I've mentioned
[00:36:10] So peace talks at Camp David, that's not going to happen anytime soon, we're not going to have that sort of swift resolution
[00:36:15] I don't think so and I don't think the US is seen as an honest broker
[00:36:20] I don't think it has the willingness to impose real consequences on Israel and clearly without imposing any real consequences without the clear downside
[00:36:30] There simply isn't an incentive at the moment for Israel to change its behavior
[00:36:35] So not to mention the fact that I don't think Hamas perceives the US to be a very amenable negotiator
[00:36:45] And I don't think the US has much leverage over Hamas either at this stage
[00:36:50] To know is the short answer isn't it?
[00:36:53] It's a conflict without an obvious power breaker to change things
[00:36:58] Hassan, thank you so much for giving us that overview of what is a very depressing situation but many thanks for doing it
[00:37:05] I'd like to say my pleasure but thank you for receiving me on the show
[00:37:10] Pleasure is the wrong word obviously but thank you, it was really interesting and thank you so much for talking to us
[00:37:16] Thanks Hassan, you're welcome
[00:37:18] We touched on what we've touched on before on this podcast as well just how much of what is happening in that part of the world
[00:37:25] There's actually just a proxy war that's being fought from Iran and it's Netanyahu really going to escalate it by taking on Iran more
[00:37:33] That's the question as well
[00:37:35] That's the big question
[00:37:36] So next week?
[00:37:37] Well anyway, next week what?
[00:37:39] Look immigration because Rishi's got a million plans
[00:37:44] Well he's only got one really hasn't he which is that everyone should go off to Rwanda
[00:37:48] It looks like he can push ahead with that, it's going to be interesting isn't it?
[00:37:52] Small numbers
[00:37:53] If he starts to see people going off and we don't, it doesn't work, it doesn't stop people coming across on boats
[00:38:00] Because he's very concerned obviously like a lot of people about the welfare of those people coming across the channel
[00:38:05] It's their welfare, it's nothing to do with the fact that they are foreign and they're coming out on shores
[00:38:10] But he also has an election to win of course which is a good point to his
[00:38:13] But if Rwanda doesn't stop that happening he has put so much of his political goodwill into this one scheme
[00:38:23] And if it doesn't work then he's curtains, well he's curtains anyway isn't he?
[00:38:27] Well that would just finish him off
[00:38:29] We will talk about all that next week
[00:38:31] Here on
[00:38:32] On the Why Curve, join us for that
[00:38:34] Thanks for listening today
[00:38:35] Bye