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[00:00:00] The Why Curve with Phil Dobbie and Roger Herring
[00:00:03] Is Ukraine on the brink of defeat?
[00:00:06] Russian forces have opened up a new front
[00:00:08] and seem to be heading for Kharkiv,
[00:00:10] Ukraine's second biggest city.
[00:00:11] Western weapons haven't been getting through fast enough to hold the line.
[00:00:15] Ukrainian troops are too few
[00:00:17] and lack equipment to push the Russians back.
[00:00:19] Could this summer see Russian military success
[00:00:22] push Zelensky to a negotiated peace or even collapse?
[00:00:25] Or can Europe and America find the resources
[00:00:28] and the will to prevent Vladimir Putin from claiming victory?
[00:00:32] The Why Curve
[00:00:34] So this does feel like the war almost that everybody has forgotten
[00:00:38] until it's lost and then all of a sudden it will be front page news again.
[00:00:42] Well, that's the thing and I think this new offensive certainly seems to suggest
[00:00:46] you know we heard all last summer about
[00:00:47] oh there was going to be a big Ukrainian offensive
[00:00:49] didn't go anywhere so it just stuck where it was.
[00:00:52] And now Vladimir Putin may be feeling a bit more stronger
[00:00:55] he's got support from China
[00:00:57] launching, I mean he's got an awful lot of troops
[00:01:00] this is the thing, a war economy now
[00:01:02] that you know he's pushed all the factories into producing armaments right across Russia.
[00:01:06] If he can push through and grab enough land
[00:01:08] I mean it's hard to see how Ukraine can hang on.
[00:01:11] But I wonder how long can you sustain that for?
[00:01:13] How long, I mean it's an economics question
[00:01:15] oh we do do economics on this podcast
[00:01:17] how long can an economy produce stuff, weapons
[00:01:21] without you know diverting resources from the mainstream economy?
[00:01:25] Well that's what Russia has done
[00:01:26] I mean they've radically put it through.
[00:01:28] But can they keep on doing that?
[00:01:29] Well it's a question of what point people say
[00:01:31] we're not getting what we want in other ways.
[00:01:33] But I mean that's an open question
[00:01:35] partly because I think people don't really know
[00:01:37] what's going on inside the Russian economy
[00:01:38] it's very hard to perceive exactly where things are coming from.
[00:01:42] But you would have thought it would be inflationary
[00:01:43] and that you've got a lot of people
[00:01:45] who are getting paid for producing those weapons
[00:01:47] and they've got that money
[00:01:49] they're not using that money to buy weapons
[00:01:50] those weapons are being used to fight the war
[00:01:52] so they've got the money to buy limited resources
[00:01:55] and you would have thought that
[00:01:56] if it went on for long enough
[00:01:57] it would be hyperinflationary.
[00:01:58] But the long enough is the point
[00:01:59] because if he can push it through
[00:02:00] to a point of winning
[00:02:01] then he doesn't need to worry about that.
[00:02:03] Meantime Ukraine doesn't have enough people
[00:02:05] doesn't have enough soldiers
[00:02:07] they're talking about various forms of additional conscription
[00:02:10] but the truth is
[00:02:11] a lot of people after this amount of time
[00:02:13] are pretty fed up with the whole thing obviously
[00:02:15] and worried
[00:02:16] and meanwhile the West doesn't seem
[00:02:18] I mean the Americans held up weapons
[00:02:19] for a very long time
[00:02:20] now they've said yes okay
[00:02:21] they can come through
[00:02:22] but they've got to get to the point
[00:02:23] now they've said yes okay
[00:02:24] they can come through
[00:02:25] but what's going to happen
[00:02:26] if Donald Trump gets into the White House in January?
[00:02:28] Yeah exactly
[00:02:29] and before that
[00:02:30] I mean Zelensky is saying
[00:02:31] well we're just not getting enough
[00:02:32] fast enough from the West
[00:02:34] and so you know
[00:02:35] is it too late already?
[00:02:36] And what about Europe stepping up to the plate
[00:02:37] you know we know that
[00:02:38] the EU is obviously extremely worried
[00:02:39] particularly Poland
[00:02:40] and other countries
[00:02:41] but are they prepared to do the necessary
[00:02:44] to keep Ukraine afloat?
[00:02:46] That's kind of the question
[00:02:47] we need to find out the answer to
[00:02:48] and to talk to us about
[00:02:49] that someone who does know
[00:02:50] what they're talking about
[00:02:51] and that's Christoph Bluth
[00:02:52] who's the Professor of International Relations
[00:02:54] and Security at the University of Bradford
[00:02:56] he joins us now
[00:02:57] So Christoph
[00:02:58] I mean do you get the sense
[00:02:59] that it's almost already too late
[00:03:01] that we've had this lapse in the fighting
[00:03:04] that Russia has gained a bit of ground
[00:03:08] things are moving too slowly for Ukraine
[00:03:10] I mean has the future direction
[00:03:12] already been set?
[00:03:13] I think that it would be
[00:03:15] too far to assert this at this time
[00:03:18] obviously Russia has
[00:03:21] Russia has gained quite a lot of momentum
[00:03:23] partly because some initiative by Ukraine failed
[00:03:27] because the defences were extremely
[00:03:30] well developed at that time
[00:03:32] so they didn't make much progress
[00:03:34] and now the momentum has reversed
[00:03:36] Russia has used the glide bombs
[00:03:38] to very great effect
[00:03:39] Just explain so
[00:03:41] those are bombs that are
[00:03:42] they're fairly low tech
[00:03:43] but very effective
[00:03:44] is that right?
[00:03:45] Yeah they're very effective
[00:03:47] they obviously travel some distance
[00:03:49] from the planes where they're delivered
[00:03:52] so it becomes harder to defend against them
[00:03:55] because the Russians can actually
[00:03:57] sit some distance away from the
[00:04:00] from the air defences that
[00:04:02] the Ukrainians are deploying
[00:04:06] but the other element obviously
[00:04:08] for Ukraine has been
[00:04:09] that it really has had
[00:04:10] an incredible shortage of munitions
[00:04:12] especially artillery shells
[00:04:14] that has changed now
[00:04:16] now they have enough artillery shells
[00:04:18] to continue for the time being
[00:04:20] so things are improving somewhat
[00:04:23] for the Ukrainians now
[00:04:24] and the Russians are still
[00:04:26] facing enormous problems
[00:04:29] they're losing so many people
[00:04:31] apparently this week there was a day
[00:04:33] when they lost 1700 people in one day
[00:04:36] so they're making very slow progress
[00:04:38] step by step
[00:04:39] and the Ukrainians haven't yet been able
[00:04:42] to hold that entirely
[00:04:44] but it's very very costly for the Russians
[00:04:46] in human terms and material terms
[00:04:48] but they seem to be able to bear the cost
[00:04:50] that's the interesting thing
[00:04:51] we were just saying in the introduction
[00:04:52] that Russia has turned its economy
[00:04:54] into a war economy
[00:04:56] and they seem to be able to produce
[00:04:58] enough missiles to be able to produce
[00:05:00] enough soldiers as well
[00:05:02] simply to slog on almost
[00:05:04] to get whatever they need
[00:05:05] is that correct?
[00:05:06] and if there were 1700 losses
[00:05:07] I'm sure that the Russian media
[00:05:08] wouldn't be reporting on that of course
[00:05:10] yes of course the Russians
[00:05:14] are trying to minimize
[00:05:16] reports about their losses
[00:05:18] and it's true
[00:05:20] they're willing to throw
[00:05:21] as much at this as possible
[00:05:23] but nevertheless
[00:05:25] I think it's not clear
[00:05:27] that they can take in Kharkiv
[00:05:30] for example at this point
[00:05:32] that they can make very major advances
[00:05:34] quickly at all
[00:05:35] it's just basically
[00:05:37] block by block
[00:05:38] they're fighting at the moment
[00:05:39] and as the Ukrainian forces
[00:05:41] are getting resupplied now
[00:05:44] that's going to become
[00:05:45] more and more difficult
[00:05:46] but there has to be some rethinking
[00:05:48] on the side of Europe
[00:05:50] and the United States
[00:05:52] of how they're going to help Ukraine with this
[00:05:54] because Russia is not going to give up
[00:05:56] are they?
[00:05:57] I mean as you say
[00:05:58] if they're suffering those losses
[00:06:00] Putin clearly isn't concerned
[00:06:02] he is not going to back down
[00:06:04] so we have a war where
[00:06:06] Russia is attacking
[00:06:07] and Ukraine
[00:06:08] all Ukraine can do
[00:06:10] is defend itself
[00:06:11] because obviously it's not going to launch
[00:06:13] counter attacks back into Russia
[00:06:15] because that would just escalate the situation
[00:06:17] so it feels like
[00:06:19] this could go on for a long time
[00:06:21] on that basis
[00:06:22] absolutely
[00:06:23] it could be a long time
[00:06:24] and moreover
[00:06:25] the problem is
[00:06:26] if there is an end to the conflict now
[00:06:29] where the situation is
[00:06:31] it's not really an end
[00:06:32] either way
[00:06:33] even if Russia
[00:06:34] managed to occupy much larger parts of Ukraine
[00:06:37] that still wouldn't be the end
[00:06:39] because then they would
[00:06:40] face an internal insurgency
[00:06:42] so the question is
[00:06:44] whether at some point
[00:06:46] the resistance in Ukraine becomes
[00:06:48] so successful
[00:06:50] that the Russians realise that they
[00:06:52] just have to cut their losses
[00:06:54] so to speak
[00:06:55] we're not at that point
[00:06:56] anywhere near
[00:06:57] yeah so the whole thing goes on
[00:06:59] for a while
[00:07:00] so just a little standing back
[00:07:01] seeing where we think this is going to go
[00:07:02] you said
[00:07:03] you think
[00:07:04] that Kharkiv is not going to be taken
[00:07:06] or is unlikely to be taken
[00:07:08] is there not some momentum
[00:07:09] with the Russians though
[00:07:10] could make that possible
[00:07:12] because
[00:07:13] President Putin was hinting
[00:07:14] when he was in China
[00:07:15] in the last few days
[00:07:16] that that was
[00:07:17] you know he wasn't
[00:07:18] his immediate objective
[00:07:19] but it might be
[00:07:20] well you can't say it's impossible
[00:07:21] I'm just saying
[00:07:22] that it's not an imminent prospect
[00:07:24] and
[00:07:25] the Ukrainians are still quite confident
[00:07:27] that they can
[00:07:28] they can
[00:07:29] they can halt
[00:07:30] the Russian progress
[00:07:31] what the Russians seem to be doing
[00:07:33] at the moment basically
[00:07:34] is trying to carve out
[00:07:35] some kind of buffer zone
[00:07:36] to protect the territory
[00:07:37] that they've already got
[00:07:39] and consolidate
[00:07:40] in some form or other
[00:07:41] now
[00:07:42] the big debate
[00:07:43] obviously has been
[00:07:44] for quite some time now
[00:07:45] that some of the constraints
[00:07:47] that the Europeans
[00:07:48] and the Americans
[00:07:49] are putting on the
[00:07:50] Ukrainians in terms
[00:07:51] of the use of the weapons
[00:07:52] may no longer
[00:07:53] be plausible at all
[00:07:54] in other words
[00:07:55] the idea that
[00:07:58] missile systems
[00:07:59] artillery systems
[00:08:00] cannot be used
[00:08:01] to attack
[00:08:02] Russian territory
[00:08:03] at all
[00:08:04] that
[00:08:05] is something
[00:08:06] that's being debated
[00:08:07] right now again
[00:08:08] Yes, because the Americans
[00:08:09] gave a pretty big hint
[00:08:10] that while they weren't saying
[00:08:11] they could
[00:08:12] they weren't saying
[00:08:13] that they couldn't
[00:08:14] use these weapons
[00:08:15] inside Russia
[00:08:16] I think in America
[00:08:17] it's the
[00:08:18] the
[00:08:19] Pentagon
[00:08:20] that is
[00:08:21] putting its foot down
[00:08:22] and trying to stop
[00:08:23] the Ukrainians
[00:08:24] from hitting long range targets
[00:08:26] from Ukrainian territory
[00:08:29] inside Russia
[00:08:32] and there is some debate now
[00:08:33] really
[00:08:34] to
[00:08:35] to argue
[00:08:36] that that is no longer
[00:08:37] appropriate
[00:08:38] that
[00:08:39] this is constraining
[00:08:40] the Ukrainians
[00:08:41] too much
[00:08:42] Yeah, we're going to get
[00:08:43] back to my point
[00:08:44] doesn't it?
[00:08:45] It's a one sided war
[00:08:46] in a way
[00:08:47] Ukraine can only
[00:08:48] defend itself
[00:08:49] Russia attacks
[00:08:50] and you know
[00:08:51] you're never going to win
[00:08:52] if all you're doing
[00:08:53] is playing defense
[00:08:54] you've got to get over
[00:08:55] that center line
[00:08:56] and move forward
[00:08:57] Yes, because Ukraine
[00:08:58] has no intention
[00:08:59] obviously of occupying Russia
[00:09:00] that would be insane
[00:09:01] they just want to
[00:09:02] disrupt the logistics
[00:09:03] and the
[00:09:05] resources that Russia
[00:09:06] is accumulating
[00:09:09] near the Ukrainian
[00:09:10] territory
[00:09:11] they have been successful
[00:09:12] in many respects
[00:09:13] I mean they have
[00:09:14] obviously disrupted
[00:09:15] the Black Sea fleet
[00:09:16] very substantially
[00:09:18] and
[00:09:20] have
[00:09:21] hit targets
[00:09:22] they have
[00:09:23] fuel depots
[00:09:24] they've hit refineries
[00:09:25] and so forth
[00:09:26] so the Russians are suffering
[00:09:27] I mean
[00:09:28] it is costing the Russians
[00:09:29] a lot
[00:09:30] they're now maybe
[00:09:31] spending about 7%
[00:09:32] of their GDP
[00:09:33] on
[00:09:34] on the military
[00:09:35] so in the longer
[00:09:36] term obviously
[00:09:37] that is going to have
[00:09:38] major consequences
[00:09:39] inside Russia itself
[00:09:40] but for the time being
[00:09:41] they can
[00:09:42] continue
[00:09:43] and they've now
[00:09:44] appointed an economist
[00:09:46] to the
[00:09:47] Minister of Defense
[00:09:48] Yes, they removed
[00:09:49] Shoigu who was
[00:09:50] the old Defense Minister
[00:09:51] who many people
[00:09:52] thought was not
[00:09:53] very competent
[00:09:54] this new man you think
[00:09:55] he's better in that role?
[00:09:56] Well, I don't know
[00:09:57] if you put an economist
[00:09:58] in charge
[00:09:59] there's every chance
[00:10:00] they're going to lose
[00:10:01] I mean that might be
[00:10:02] their Achilles heel
[00:10:03] I think the
[00:10:04] thing that's been
[00:10:05] in the Russian military
[00:10:06] for decades
[00:10:07] and even perhaps
[00:10:08] back into the Soviet period
[00:10:09] is that there's so much
[00:10:10] corruption in the military
[00:10:11] because the military
[00:10:12] is very resource rich
[00:10:13] and so there are many
[00:10:14] people who are
[00:10:15] taking the resources
[00:10:16] for themselves
[00:10:17] in many ways
[00:10:18] and others
[00:10:19] so they're trying to
[00:10:20] make it more
[00:10:21] accountable
[00:10:22] and prevent the loss
[00:10:23] of resources
[00:10:24] I mean one of the deputies
[00:10:26] of Shoigu
[00:10:27] was
[00:10:28] accused of corruption
[00:10:31] and there is a lot
[00:10:32] of corruption
[00:10:33] in the system
[00:10:34] so I think they are
[00:10:36] thinking now that
[00:10:37] they need some
[00:10:38] greater efficiency
[00:10:39] in the way in which
[00:10:40] people and resources
[00:10:42] are deployed
[00:10:43] whether it will be
[00:10:44] effective or not
[00:10:45] remains to be seen
[00:10:46] I mean you wonder
[00:10:47] how long they can
[00:10:48] carry on for that
[00:10:49] if they are spending
[00:10:50] 7% of their GDP
[00:10:51] on fighting this war
[00:10:53] that is a
[00:10:54] that's a slug of money
[00:10:55] that's employing
[00:10:56] resources that are
[00:10:57] obviously not
[00:10:58] getting to people
[00:10:59] for their everyday life
[00:11:00] so people will
[00:11:01] start to suffer
[00:11:02] if this carries on
[00:11:03] for a long period of time
[00:11:04] oh yes absolutely
[00:11:06] now
[00:11:07] at what point
[00:11:08] that becomes politically important
[00:11:10] is unknown at this time
[00:11:12] for the time being
[00:11:13] it doesn't seem to have
[00:11:15] put in positions particularly
[00:11:19] but
[00:11:20] the reverse side
[00:11:21] of the coin is that
[00:11:23] people are saying now that
[00:11:25] the Europeans and Americans
[00:11:27] are not putting in
[00:11:28] sufficient resources
[00:11:29] and there's still
[00:11:30] the dispute
[00:11:31] as you know
[00:11:32] about the use of
[00:11:33] frozen Russian assets
[00:11:35] which
[00:11:36] are not being mobilized
[00:11:37] for this effort
[00:11:38] well the EU is
[00:11:39] sort of moving on that
[00:11:40] I heard in the last few days
[00:11:41] suggestions that there
[00:11:42] may now be a plan
[00:11:43] to use some of those
[00:11:44] frozen assets
[00:11:45] do you think
[00:11:46] that's going to happen
[00:11:47] and would that
[00:11:48] benefit Ukraine?
[00:11:49] well it would benefit Ukraine
[00:11:50] because of the constraints
[00:11:52] that
[00:11:53] the budgets of European states
[00:11:55] and the United States have
[00:11:56] especially the United States
[00:11:57] obviously
[00:11:58] because there has been
[00:11:59] so much opposition
[00:12:00] from the Congress
[00:12:01] to releasing these funds
[00:12:05] so yes more money
[00:12:06] but
[00:12:07] obviously not just money
[00:12:09] they need to get
[00:12:10] the supplies in
[00:12:12] terms of the military hardware
[00:12:14] that they need
[00:12:15] ammunition especially
[00:12:16] ammunition as has been
[00:12:17] obviously
[00:12:18] a big problem
[00:12:20] and where have the
[00:12:21] ammunition
[00:12:22] where has this been coming from
[00:12:23] by and large the
[00:12:24] ammunition which countries
[00:12:25] are producing it
[00:12:26] and have they
[00:12:27] got the capability
[00:12:28] to step it up
[00:12:29] fine if you
[00:12:30] use those assets
[00:12:31] for the cash
[00:12:32] to pay for those
[00:12:33] ammunitions
[00:12:34] but what about
[00:12:35] the production capability?
[00:12:36] yeah I mean
[00:12:37] there are very significant
[00:12:38] production capabilities
[00:12:39] there are
[00:12:41] production capabilities
[00:12:42] in Germany for example
[00:12:43] there are obviously
[00:12:44] production capabilities
[00:12:45] in the United States
[00:12:46] and
[00:12:47] as I say
[00:12:48] they have now been able
[00:12:49] to provide
[00:12:50] Ukraine with
[00:12:51] artillery shells
[00:12:53] that
[00:12:54] are necessary
[00:12:55] but
[00:12:56] the Germans have
[00:12:57] been very adamant
[00:12:58] not to provide
[00:12:59] the Taurus cruise missile
[00:13:00] which
[00:13:01] has a further reach
[00:13:03] again because they
[00:13:04] fear it might go
[00:13:05] inside Russia
[00:13:06] is that right?
[00:13:07] yes and then
[00:13:08] Germany would become
[00:13:09] more closely
[00:13:10] associated with
[00:13:11] a conflict against
[00:13:12] Russia
[00:13:13] now
[00:13:14] the way in which
[00:13:15] this conflict
[00:13:16] is shaped
[00:13:17] and defined
[00:13:18] differs from NATO country
[00:13:19] to NATO country
[00:13:20] to some extent
[00:13:21] with obviously
[00:13:22] countries like
[00:13:23] Poland
[00:13:24] and the Baltic states
[00:13:25] being much more
[00:13:26] willing to
[00:13:27] and adamant
[00:13:28] that Ukraine should
[00:13:29] be supported
[00:13:30] and the United States
[00:13:31] being willing to
[00:13:32] support
[00:13:33] Ukraine
[00:13:34] Germany hasn't
[00:13:35] goes through phases
[00:13:36] they have supplied
[00:13:37] a lot
[00:13:38] but sometimes
[00:13:39] you can see the
[00:13:40] hesitancy still on
[00:13:41] the German side
[00:13:42] why do you think
[00:13:43] that is in Germany
[00:13:44] is it for
[00:13:45] historical reasons
[00:13:46] or is there
[00:13:47] something to do with
[00:13:48] I mean the past
[00:13:49] a number of
[00:13:50] senior German figures
[00:13:51] have been
[00:13:52] quite close to
[00:13:53] Russia
[00:13:54] some of the leaders
[00:13:55] yes of course
[00:13:56] in the
[00:13:57] political period
[00:13:58] in Germany
[00:13:59] was still
[00:14:00] strongly committed to
[00:14:01] kind of
[00:14:02] including Russia
[00:14:03] in the
[00:14:04] European system
[00:14:05] of states
[00:14:06] although by
[00:14:07] some people would say
[00:14:08] by the time
[00:14:09] the Georgia
[00:14:10] intervention happened
[00:14:11] in 2008
[00:14:12] that was basically
[00:14:13] a lost cause already
[00:14:14] and Germany
[00:14:16] wasn't
[00:14:17] able to recognize
[00:14:18] enough
[00:14:19] how the situation
[00:14:20] was shifting
[00:14:21] and
[00:14:22] but
[00:14:23] now that you've
[00:14:24] got
[00:14:25] the
[00:14:26] SPS Chancellor
[00:14:27] in office
[00:14:28] and
[00:14:29] he's still
[00:14:30] in this mindset
[00:14:31] that
[00:14:32] one should
[00:14:33] try to negotiate
[00:14:34] with Russia
[00:14:35] and should try
[00:14:36] to deal
[00:14:37] with Russia
[00:14:38] in some way
[00:14:39] politically
[00:14:40] but that seems
[00:14:41] to be at the
[00:14:42] moment
[00:14:43] impossible
[00:14:44] I mean we have
[00:14:45] to admit of
[00:14:46] course that
[00:14:47] Germany has
[00:14:48] changed quite
[00:14:49] dramatically
[00:14:50] because at the
[00:14:51] very beginning
[00:14:52] of this conflict
[00:14:53] they were just
[00:14:54] and they've given
[00:14:55] Ukraine some of their
[00:14:56] most advanced
[00:14:57] battle tanks
[00:14:59] for example
[00:15:00] but
[00:15:01] there's
[00:15:02] still areas
[00:15:03] where they're
[00:15:04] unwilling to
[00:15:05] support Ukraine
[00:15:06] and the question
[00:15:08] of the F-16s
[00:15:09] for example
[00:15:10] I mean has taken
[00:15:11] a very very long time
[00:15:13] and how many
[00:15:14] of they're going to get
[00:15:15] and how effective
[00:15:16] they're going to be
[00:15:17] still remains to be seen
[00:15:18] When do you think
[00:15:19] that will happen
[00:15:20] because we have spoken
[00:15:21] about these F-16
[00:15:22] the advanced warplanes
[00:15:23] at lots of points
[00:15:24] and you know the Ukrainians
[00:15:25] were relying on old
[00:15:26] MIGs at various points
[00:15:27] and we now know
[00:15:28] that the F-16s
[00:15:29] are coming
[00:15:30] and there's training going on
[00:15:31] but when will they
[00:15:32] actually be in action?
[00:15:33] Yeah, that's very unclear
[00:15:35] I mean there obviously
[00:15:36] it's obviously very complicated
[00:15:37] hardware
[00:15:38] and pilots need training
[00:15:40] but it's taken a lot longer
[00:15:41] than people anticipated
[00:15:43] when the idea was first mooted
[00:15:47] So there is this kind of
[00:15:48] combination of
[00:15:49] political hesitancy
[00:15:51] and uncertainty
[00:15:52] political restrictions
[00:15:53] that are being put on
[00:15:55] and just the sheer
[00:15:58] logistical issues
[00:15:59] of getting material together
[00:16:01] of training
[00:16:02] and all of these
[00:16:03] these factors
[00:16:04] have slowed it down
[00:16:06] quite significantly
[00:16:07] And is there enough
[00:16:08] critical mass
[00:16:09] in Ukraine
[00:16:10] to pick up again?
[00:16:11] So if we get more arms
[00:16:14] if we get the ability
[00:16:15] to start stepping up
[00:16:17] the defence
[00:16:18] and the attack profiles
[00:16:21] are there enough people?
[00:16:22] Is there enough logistics?
[00:16:23] Is there enough experience?
[00:16:25] Or is it just being
[00:16:26] hammered away for so long now
[00:16:28] that even if you have
[00:16:29] all that extra weaponry
[00:16:31] you've still lost the edge
[00:16:32] You don't have the people
[00:16:33] willing to
[00:16:34] able to use it
[00:16:35] or the expertise
[00:16:36] Yeah, it's the manpower
[00:16:37] I think the Ukrainians
[00:16:38] have shown themselves
[00:16:39] incredibly adept
[00:16:40] not only at
[00:16:42] at using equipment
[00:16:43] that they're getting
[00:16:44] and being trained on it
[00:16:45] but also at being very innovative
[00:16:47] in terms of
[00:16:48] the tactics that they're using
[00:16:50] and developing new technology
[00:16:52] especially the drone production
[00:16:53] in Ukraine and so forth
[00:16:54] has been quite remarkable
[00:16:56] They have faced the problem
[00:16:58] of course of manpower
[00:17:00] I mean if Russia
[00:17:01] has a manpower power problem
[00:17:02] Ukraine has an even bigger
[00:17:03] manpower problem
[00:17:04] for obvious reasons
[00:17:05] They have solved this now
[00:17:07] I think for the time being
[00:17:09] but that will come up again
[00:17:11] in future no doubt
[00:17:12] depending on how long
[00:17:13] this conflict goes on
[00:17:14] Solved it by widening
[00:17:15] the number of people
[00:17:16] that are there
[00:17:17] the number of people
[00:17:18] they are conscripting
[00:17:19] Yes, exactly
[00:17:21] So they have conscripted
[00:17:23] more people
[00:17:25] Less willing people
[00:17:26] presumably
[00:17:29] I mean you might
[00:17:30] you know the quality
[00:17:31] of the fighting
[00:17:32] that you're getting
[00:17:33] might be going down
[00:17:34] and also the casualty rate
[00:17:35] is very high
[00:17:38] so the willingness
[00:17:39] of people to go into
[00:17:40] what appears to be
[00:17:41] a terrible death factory
[00:17:43] must be quite hard
[00:17:44] Yes, but there is
[00:17:45] some interesting asymmetries
[00:17:46] On the one hand
[00:17:47] the Russians have
[00:17:48] a potential advantage
[00:17:51] in quantity
[00:17:52] but the quality
[00:17:53] is really poor
[00:17:56] I mean compared to the Ukrainians
[00:17:57] the Ukrainians obviously
[00:17:58] have a very strong reason
[00:17:59] to defend their entire existence
[00:18:02] and so I think in terms of manpower
[00:18:05] at least as far as
[00:18:06] the quality of manpower goes
[00:18:08] Ukrainians have quite
[00:18:09] a distinct advantage over Russia
[00:18:10] So it seems whenever
[00:18:12] Ukraine gets the upper hand
[00:18:14] Russia starts talking about
[00:18:15] nuclear weapons again
[00:18:16] So we had Russia's
[00:18:17] defence ministry saying
[00:18:18] it's begun a round of drills
[00:18:20] that involves tactical nuclear weapons
[00:18:22] Is that all just bluster?
[00:18:24] Or is that something
[00:18:25] we should be very concerned about?
[00:18:26] First of all
[00:18:27] it's obviously a sign of weakness
[00:18:28] If you are supposedly
[00:18:30] this vast military power
[00:18:32] and then you have to
[00:18:34] fall back on nuclear weapons
[00:18:35] because you're doing poorly
[00:18:36] on the battlefield
[00:18:37] that is a sign of weakness
[00:18:38] rather than strength
[00:18:41] I think so far
[00:18:42] it seems clear
[00:18:44] that the Russians
[00:18:45] are not willing to risk
[00:18:46] the use of nuclear weapons
[00:18:47] because they realise
[00:18:48] that could bring the war
[00:18:51] to Moscow basically
[00:18:52] I mean the Americans
[00:18:53] have made it quite clear
[00:18:54] that if nuclear weapons
[00:18:55] are being used
[00:18:56] then these many constraints
[00:18:58] are going to fall
[00:18:59] They haven't threatened
[00:19:00] interestingly enough
[00:19:01] Russia directly with nuclear use themselves
[00:19:05] but they've given clear warnings
[00:19:07] to Russia
[00:19:08] that the constraints
[00:19:09] on direct American involvement
[00:19:10] might fall away
[00:19:11] if they use nuclear weapons
[00:19:13] But if they use nuclear weapons
[00:19:15] even a small tactical nuclear weapon
[00:19:17] that would be so devastating to Ukraine
[00:19:20] that Russia could win the war
[00:19:21] before these constraints even matter?
[00:19:24] Well it depends on what you mean
[00:19:25] by winning the war
[00:19:27] Will they be able to occupy
[00:19:29] and control the country?
[00:19:30] That sounds clear to me
[00:19:32] even if they use nuclear weapons
[00:19:33] Yes, it would be devastating
[00:19:34] without a doubt
[00:19:36] but that doesn't mean
[00:19:37] it would give Russia
[00:19:38] what Russia would want
[00:19:41] Well as you say
[00:19:42] it brings the war home doesn't it?
[00:19:43] Because the West is not going to sit by
[00:19:44] and just watch that happen
[00:19:45] There is going to be some sort of
[00:19:46] response to that in some form
[00:19:48] Well there have been
[00:19:51] very clear discussions
[00:19:52] as far as we understand
[00:19:53] between the United States government
[00:19:55] and the Russian government
[00:19:56] on this matter
[00:19:58] Now we haven't been told
[00:20:00] exactly what the Americans
[00:20:01] have said to the Russians
[00:20:03] but what we can gather
[00:20:05] is that first of all
[00:20:06] they haven't threatened
[00:20:08] the use of nuclear weapons
[00:20:10] but they have threatened
[00:20:13] severe consequences probably
[00:20:15] in the use of strategic
[00:20:18] non-nuclear weapons
[00:20:20] What would that mean in effect?
[00:20:22] Yeah, they could launch targets
[00:20:27] Well Petraeus has said once
[00:20:31] and I don't know how much he knows
[00:20:32] about what's going on
[00:20:33] in the Pentagon now
[00:20:34] but General Paterius said
[00:20:37] that if the Russians do this
[00:20:38] then they should first of all
[00:20:40] finish off the Black Sea fleet
[00:20:42] and secondly destroy
[00:20:43] the Russian army completely
[00:20:45] This is General Paterius
[00:20:46] the former major
[00:20:48] former general in the US military
[00:20:50] who was very distinguished
[00:20:52] in Afghanistan and elsewhere
[00:20:53] Yes, exactly
[00:20:54] What we haven't mentioned
[00:20:55] in all this is the political situation
[00:20:58] in Ukraine
[00:20:59] because there have been issues
[00:21:00] and question marks over Zelensky
[00:21:03] and his actions
[00:21:04] He got rid of a very senior commander
[00:21:07] People were concerned about that
[00:21:09] and he now is in a position
[00:21:11] perhaps where his support is diminishing
[00:21:13] Do you think he and his government
[00:21:16] have the necessary strength
[00:21:18] in the middle of all this?
[00:21:19] Well, I mean, Zelensky has proved himself
[00:21:21] to be quite an extraordinary leader
[00:21:23] given that he was an actor professionally
[00:21:26] and somehow he should have become
[00:21:28] an accidental president
[00:21:30] and nobody thought much of him
[00:21:33] when he first came into office
[00:21:35] and he has been an extraordinary war leader
[00:21:38] I think nobody expected that
[00:21:40] this is how it would turn out
[00:21:42] I mean, it's a bit like us going to war
[00:21:44] with Ricky Gervais in charge, isn't it really?
[00:21:48] We wouldn't be in a good position
[00:21:49] but as you say, he's risen to the challenge
[00:21:51] The full focus too much
[00:21:53] It does
[00:21:54] But he's risen to the challenge
[00:21:55] But there are, but Christoph
[00:21:56] there have been issues recently
[00:21:58] I mean, I've certainly seen criticism
[00:21:59] of him building within Ukraine
[00:22:01] I've seen suggestions
[00:22:02] that he feels his power is under threat
[00:22:04] which may have been why he got rid of
[00:22:06] one of the top commanders
[00:22:08] I mean, there are question marks
[00:22:09] Yes, of course
[00:22:10] I mean, there are these kind of tensions
[00:22:15] that on the one hand
[00:22:16] nobody wants to attack a leader
[00:22:19] in the middle of the war
[00:22:20] but on the other hand
[00:22:21] there are obvious tensions
[00:22:24] within the leadership
[00:22:26] when the issues are so complex
[00:22:28] and the situation is so dire
[00:22:30] And so it's possible that there will be some momentum
[00:22:38] but I don't see at the moment
[00:22:40] that this landscape
[00:22:42] there is always this question
[00:22:44] I mean, we know obviously that prior to the war
[00:22:47] there were lots of issues about corruption
[00:22:50] in the elite in Ukraine
[00:22:52] and these issues have been kind of
[00:22:54] suppressed a little bit
[00:22:55] but they still exist
[00:22:59] and war, which is always based on the concentration
[00:23:03] a lot of resources
[00:23:06] gives again opportunities for corruption
[00:23:08] Nevertheless, I think at the moment
[00:23:10] Zelensky appears to be relatively secure
[00:23:13] And the idea of taking Kiev
[00:23:15] that's just a pipe dream for the Russians
[00:23:17] is the ability to hold the capital
[00:23:20] Is that still there?
[00:23:21] For the time being
[00:23:22] I don't see Russia making any quick major gains
[00:23:27] in Ukraine at all
[00:23:29] So I think for most of the year
[00:23:33] we won't see
[00:23:34] We will see only very incremental increases
[00:23:37] and it could very well be
[00:23:39] that at some point
[00:23:41] the Ukrainians may be able to take some territory back again
[00:23:44] That's very unpredictable
[00:23:46] So we can only really
[00:23:48] we can't really predict what's happening
[00:23:50] in the longer term
[00:23:51] I think more importantly is
[00:23:54] is that really
[00:23:56] the NATO countries need to think much more seriously
[00:23:58] how they can take measures
[00:24:01] that push the war towards a quicker end
[00:24:03] Because...
[00:24:04] What would they be?
[00:24:06] And you think that, you know
[00:24:08] the end has got to be a negotiation of some sort
[00:24:10] but that seems so unlikely
[00:24:11] because first of all neither side wants to talk
[00:24:14] what they want is so distant from each other
[00:24:17] So I mean what is the path to an end?
[00:24:20] I can't see one
[00:24:21] Well the only way would be to
[00:24:23] lift some of the restrictions on the use of
[00:24:26] Western military hardware
[00:24:28] and to enable the Ukrainians to much more decisively
[00:24:31] disrupt the logistics and the
[00:24:34] storage of fuel and weapon systems
[00:24:38] and make it much much harder for the
[00:24:40] so hard for the Russians to fight
[00:24:42] that they are at risk of losing substantial ground
[00:24:46] So Russia then stops, I can't see
[00:24:48] Putin doesn't seem like the sort of man
[00:24:50] who is just going to go
[00:24:51] Oh we tried
[00:24:52] better luck next time I give in
[00:24:54] I mean that's not his personality
[00:24:57] is it obviously?
[00:24:58] Yes but at some point
[00:24:59] sure he is very stubborn
[00:25:02] but at the moment
[00:25:03] he still believes
[00:25:05] there is still some reason for him to believe
[00:25:07] that he can continue
[00:25:09] and can possibly reverse the tide of the war
[00:25:12] and if there is sufficient aid given to Ukraine
[00:25:16] to make this seem completely implausible
[00:25:19] then the attitude to negotiations might change
[00:25:23] The elephant in the room of course is Donald Trump
[00:25:25] if he becomes president at the beginning of next year
[00:25:28] how does that change things?
[00:25:29] Because he did say, it was a while back now
[00:25:31] but he said he could solve the whole thing in a day
[00:25:33] I think that probably meant Ukraine would be
[00:25:35] surrendering a great deal of territory
[00:25:37] which would sort of suggest that
[00:25:39] he's not going to be totally happy about
[00:25:41] supplying unlimited funding
[00:25:44] He did let the Republicans in the House of Representatives
[00:25:47] back in the end or enough of them back
[00:25:50] the delivery of the weapons
[00:25:52] so maybe is it possible to say
[00:25:54] that he's changed as well?
[00:25:55] Well Donald Trump talks a lot
[00:25:57] and he likes to give you the impression
[00:26:00] that he can solve big problems very quickly
[00:26:04] but he never does
[00:26:06] No no he doesn't
[00:26:08] I think this is a real unknown
[00:26:12] and probably even unknown to Trump himself
[00:26:14] exactly what he would be doing
[00:26:17] He hasn't been willing to be any more forthcoming
[00:26:21] I mean one option for him might be obviously
[00:26:25] if he wanted to prove that he can solve the problem
[00:26:28] is to escalate American support very dramatically
[00:26:31] or it could be the exact reverse
[00:26:34] It's hard to see
[00:26:37] Christoph one thought occurs
[00:26:40] I think we can draw this discussion towards an end
[00:26:42] but is it not also possible to say
[00:26:44] that perhaps a different way of looking at this
[00:26:46] to say Vladimir Putin has got himself
[00:26:48] into a complete mess with this
[00:26:50] he's committed himself to something that's draining his economy
[00:26:53] seems to be at a kind of stalemate in one form or another
[00:26:56] Is there not an advantage perhaps to the West
[00:26:59] and certainly to Europe
[00:27:00] if it just stays pretty much as it is
[00:27:02] There's limits to what he can do
[00:27:04] while he's stuck in this position
[00:27:06] It's like not interrupting your enemy
[00:27:08] when he's making a mistake
[00:27:10] and that in a way a stalemate
[00:27:12] actually wouldn't be the worst outcome of this for Europe
[00:27:15] That seems a slightly cynical way of looking at it
[00:27:20] I'm afraid that's dashed
[00:27:22] So they hold their lines
[00:27:24] They just say well let's hold our positions
[00:27:26] but let's just not use the ammunition
[00:27:29] because that's an expense
[00:27:31] We won't fight back if you don't fight back
[00:27:34] Well kind of
[00:27:35] But I just think the situation as it is
[00:27:38] might not be the worst outcome
[00:27:41] as I say for European politicians
[00:27:43] who want to weaken Vladimir Putin
[00:27:45] But for how long?
[00:27:46] Well that's the question
[00:27:47] What do you think Christoph?
[00:27:48] I think they're thinking about this differently
[00:27:50] I think they think that Russia should not be in the position
[00:27:53] that a nuclear weapon state should be permitted
[00:27:56] to engage in this kind of aggression
[00:27:59] and that Russia should become
[00:28:02] a state that fits into the international order
[00:28:05] as it's conceived in terms of international law
[00:28:07] in the United Nations by western countries
[00:28:10] and that there is a potentially great space for Russia
[00:28:17] in the international system
[00:28:18] because Russia is potentially a very great country
[00:28:23] But because it's seeking to advance its objectives
[00:28:26] with the use of coercion and military force
[00:28:28] that is something that has to be resisted
[00:28:30] and that Russia shouldn't be rewarded for
[00:28:32] Now that's a kind of very idealistic perspective
[00:28:35] And the end to the war
[00:28:37] is probably going to be a lot more messy than that
[00:28:40] But I don't think they think of it in these terms
[00:28:44] that as long as Russia is...
[00:28:46] I mean obviously Ukraine is suffering an enormous amount
[00:28:50] and this kind of conflict is very costly for everybody
[00:28:54] So if we could see a quicker end to this...
[00:28:59] Then we should do it
[00:29:00] But who would negotiate that?
[00:29:01] Because obviously a negotiation directly between Russia and Ukraine
[00:29:05] isn't going to lead anywhere
[00:29:06] Getting the United States involved
[00:29:08] possibly isn't going to be particularly helpful
[00:29:11] particularly if Donald Trump is the president
[00:29:13] I mean should we be looking at places
[00:29:15] that are supposedly helping Russia in all of this?
[00:29:18] Places like China for example
[00:29:20] where we start to have a discussion
[00:29:23] where they almost get involved in trying to arrive at...
[00:29:27] Well they've already got a peace plan
[00:29:29] The Chinese have put one forward
[00:29:30] but it doesn't seem to be what anyone wants
[00:29:32] Well I think the way in which I read the Western position
[00:29:37] at the moment, the American and European position
[00:29:39] is that this is a matter that Ukraine should negotiate
[00:29:42] but they will without a doubt advise Ukraine informally
[00:29:48] of some of the parameters if it comes to this point
[00:29:52] What we had during the Cold War was a temporary territorial settlement
[00:29:56] in the sense that the Western countries never accepted
[00:29:59] Soviet domination over Eastern Europe
[00:30:02] but they always said we will not use force to change that
[00:30:05] And you could see something like this in Ukraine
[00:30:08] which is that we accept that Russia is occupying Donbas
[00:30:12] and these new territories allegedly integrated now into the Russian Federation
[00:30:20] So we accept the fact that that exists
[00:30:23] We don't think it's legitimate
[00:30:25] but we won't use force to change that
[00:30:27] Something along those lines
[00:30:29] And then we just accept that everything has gone before that
[00:30:32] So for example kids that have been taken away
[00:30:35] and now going to school in Russia who've been...
[00:30:38] Forcibly abducted
[00:30:39] All of that, we just say well that's a bit unfortunate
[00:30:41] Not to mention of course some of the crimes of which we have
[00:30:45] or the international community has accused Vladimir Putin
[00:30:48] and some of his staff of doing
[00:30:50] Do we just have a poor memory to all that sort of stuff?
[00:30:52] I'm not sure that's necessarily going to be the case
[00:30:54] but the means whereby this is going to be pursued
[00:30:57] are going to be political rather than military
[00:30:59] That's the last time we spoke
[00:31:00] I think you were saying this is going to be a long war
[00:31:02] It certainly is
[00:31:03] It seems like you're saying the same thing again
[00:31:04] Six miles from now if we talk to you again
[00:31:06] Christophe, do you think it's going to be any different?
[00:31:08] It'll be different but we'll still probably be in the war
[00:31:11] You don't know who's advantage will be at that point that isn't now?
[00:31:15] We're still at loggerheads, by the way
[00:31:16] It depends a great deal on whether there is any significant change
[00:31:22] in the policy of how we're supporting Ukraine
[00:31:24] because that would make an enormous difference
[00:31:27] because the Ukrainians are very, very adept at using technology
[00:31:31] and the technology, this is an important point
[00:31:35] NATO's technology is in many respects
[00:31:38] I mean there's some exceptions
[00:31:40] but in many respects about two generations ahead of that of Russia
[00:31:43] So NATO can help Ukraine a lot
[00:31:48] but there needs to be probably some kind of significant change
[00:31:53] both in European and NATO and the United States
[00:31:56] to reverse the current momentum in the conflict
[00:32:00] We'll see if that comes through
[00:32:02] Christophe, thank you so much for doing that
[00:32:03] Thanks Christophe
[00:32:04] I appreciate your time
[00:32:05] and perhaps we'll talk again in six months and see where we are
[00:32:07] But thank you for being with us
[00:32:08] Thank you
[00:32:09] I just can't help feeling it
[00:32:11] It's got to be a political answer, hasn't it?
[00:32:13] Otherwise you've just got two sides fighting each other
[00:32:16] It goes on forever
[00:32:17] There has to be some sort of political solution
[00:32:19] That's what I wonder about, cynical point about
[00:32:21] Well actually, you know, I feel we live with that
[00:32:23] Maybe the answer is we just live with it
[00:32:25] And maybe it's not the worst thing because it keeps Putin occupied
[00:32:28] Yeah, well so you mentioned war crimes and whether we...
[00:32:32] I did
[00:32:33] And Putin is not the only man being accused
[00:32:35] Well not necessarily being of war crimes
[00:32:38] But the idea that we should be...
[00:32:40] We have the International Criminal Court now
[00:32:42] with an arrest warrant against...
[00:32:44] Against the Prime Minister of Israel
[00:32:46] and several members of his cabinet
[00:32:48] A country that has been recognised up to now as democratic
[00:32:52] and western-oriented
[00:32:55] I mean, it's quite a move, quite the change
[00:32:57] and obviously related very closely to everything that's been going on in Gaza
[00:33:02] And of course there are warrants as well of course for the
[00:33:04] or will be potentially warrants for leaders of Hamas
[00:33:08] It's quite a change, quite a step change in terms of system international justice
[00:33:12] Not well received obviously by many western countries
[00:33:15] But it still stands though
[00:33:17] Well it will stand if they get the arrest warrant
[00:33:19] They've applied for them, it's not technically there
[00:33:21] but it's certainly crossed the line
[00:33:23] So if it was granted and Netanyahu for example arrived in Germany
[00:33:28] or somewhere in Europe
[00:33:29] Potentially he could be arrested
[00:33:30] Right
[00:33:31] Or would need to be arrested
[00:33:32] But there have been lots of arrest warrants out for various leaders around the world
[00:33:36] including Vladimir Putin but others too
[00:33:38] and very few arrests
[00:33:39] In fact, various people say the only people who actually end up going to jail
[00:33:42] from the International Criminal Court are former African dictators
[00:33:46] and not even that many of those
[00:33:47] So to what extent does that system, the International Criminal Court
[00:33:51] Does it work?
[00:33:53] Does it make any sense?
[00:33:54] Is it justice even?
[00:33:55] That's what we're going to have a look at
[00:33:57] And how do they arrive at that decision?
[00:33:58] How do they do it?
[00:33:59] We're going to look at that in our next episode
[00:34:01] Of The Y-Curve
[00:34:02] Next week, same time
[00:34:03] We'll see you then
[00:34:04] Thanks for listening in
[00:34:05] We'll catch you then
[00:34:06] Bye
[00:34:07] The Y-Curve